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The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational
Law: Non-State Enterprises in Polycentric
Asymmetric Global Orders
Larry Catá Backer*
A BSTRACT

Globalization has produced a wealth of writing that seeks to theorize the emerging relationships between states, non-state actors (especially multinational corporations), and international organizations. For
lawyers, the relationship among these actors through law is especially
meaningful. What has been emerging in recent years with greater clarity is that while the formal structures of the organization of law and its
relationship to the state system remains substantially unchanged, the
realities on the ground have moved substantially away from these formal structures. The traditional premises that have been used to justify
and explain the relationships among states, non-state actors, international organizations, law and governance no longer adequately either
explain or justify the actual behaviors and outlooks of these actors.
This essay considers the tension between the traditional premises of
organizing governance (within and through states) and the emerging
transnational legal order. The focus of examination is the corporation,
which is where this tension is most evident. The analysis starts with
the ideology of the state order, which disguises alternative governance
orders and the governments through which they are operationalized.
It is with the effects of the ideology of the state order that the analytical
limitations of analysis become clearer, the object of Section II. Sections
III and IV explore the power of ideology in framing analysis in the
conception of the reality of self-constitutionalizing organization outside the state and in the theorizing of transnational law as method.
Both suggest the ways in which the ideologies of framing analysis can
color both the way in which relationships are understood and the objectives of analysis are formed. Section V then posits an alternative
analysis, normatively autonomous (though not entirely free) of the orbit of the state, a vision possible only when the ideological presumptions of the state are suspended.
1

BACKER.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

3/1/2017 6:23 PM

[Vol. 31

I. I NTRODUCTION
Our conceptions of the state—and of the character of the legitimacy of law as a product of domestic legal orders—have a profound
effect on the way in which theorists, politicians, and lawyers are able
to approach the identification of “problem” and offer “solutions.”1 The
constitution of the state is often memorialized through documents or
understanding of higher law that serves as a barrier between the state
and others and between the higher order commands of that order and
everything else that might constitute rules of behavior or authority to
command. Gunther Frankenburg spoke of these constitutions as embedded in and creating the space within which law, politics, economics
and culture may function in a coherent and self-referencing space. 2
* W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor of International
Affairs, Pennsylvania State University, and is the incoming chair of the Pennsylvania State University Faculty Senate. The author may be contacted at lcb911@gmail.com. The essay was originated in a Global Governance Debate of the Robert Schuman Centre’s Global Governance Programme (European University Institute) with Professor Peer Zumbansen (Osgoode Hall, York
University, Toronto, Canada) on the topic “Tension Between Public and Private Governance in
the Emerging Transnational Legal Order,” Florence, Italy, April 16, 2012. My thanks to my
research assistants Robert Marriott (PSU Law 2013) and Angelo Mancini (PSU Law expected
2017) for their usual excellent contributions.
1. There is an orthodoxy in matters of both the idea of the constitutional state and the
structures for the expression of state power and control through law that is socialized especially
in lawyers and those who perform services within and for government. “Never before has there
been such demand from courts, lawyers and constitution-makers in a wide range of countries for
comparative legal analysis. And never before has the field been so institutionalized . . . .”
ROSALIND DIXON & TOM GINSBERG, Introduction, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1–17 (Tom Ginsberg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). This orthodoxy extends to international law as well, especially as it intertwines with orthodox consensus on the premises of the
constitutional systems of domestic legal orders. “Proceeding from the concept of higher law,
comparison has to deal with the related prescriptive aspects of constitutions as an instrument of
governance and government allocating, balancing, and controlling political power, as well as a
charter laying down the ground rules for social conflicts.” Gunter Frankenberg, Constitution as
Law, Instrument and Culture, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 171,
172 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). And it is also a foundation for the self-conceptions
of international law and order. See, e.g., ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE:
FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964); J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce
Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, INT’L ORG., Winter 1994, at 107, 107–30 (1994). Its pedigree is long and quite
selectively privileged to support the core notions that lend themselves to an understanding of the
organization of power at the apex of which is the state, which expresses its most authoritative
commands through law, including the law creating the administrative mechanisms that regulate
the daily lives of legal objects. See, e.g., MICHAEL KEATING, PLURINATIONAL DEMOCRACY:
STATELESS NATIONS IN A POST-SOVEREIGNTY ERA (2004).
2. He explains:
In tracing and mapping the development of modern constitutions, and with some additional modeling, one may come up with four models defined by a distinct basic structure: constitution as contract (including social contract), manifesto, program, and
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Michael Walzer 3 speaks of the moral standing of states and of the
moral presumptions from out of which the political order is founded.
The state is constituted by the union of people and government, and
it is the state that claims against all other states the twin rights of
territorial integrity and political sovereignty. . . . It is, or it ought to
be, determined instead by a morally necessary presumption: that
there exists a certain “fit” between the community and its government and that the state is “legitimate.” . . . So long as it stands, however, the boundaries of international society stand with it. 4

These structures of construction, in turn, serve as a proxy for a
complex and deeply embedded ideology of politics—bound to blood
and territory—that serves as the foundation of political, economic, social and cultural theory. That is, in fact, how “we” have been acculturated to “see” and “abstract” the reality around “us” in the social space
in which we interact.
Yet, “‘constitution’ – like ‘nation,’ ‘state,’ ‘democracy’ and ‘sovereignty,’ – appears as one of the central icons and also one of the most
ambiguous ideological structures in the pool of cultural representations of modernity.” 5 These conceptions are at base the product of applied ideology. 6 States often evidence their ruling ideologies in their
core documents—constitutions, germinal judicial opinion, and the
like. 7 In the social sciences, including the academic study of law, 8 the
law. . . . One should not place too much weight, however, on this analogy, as these
archetypes rather than elucidating a “constitutional unconscious” merely capture and
shape the transnational flow of constitutional imagination and the practice it informs.
Thus, the archetypes qualify as specimen for copies and variations.
Gunter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology—Toward a Layered
Narrative, INT’L J. CONST. L., July 2006, at 439, 451–59.
3. Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States, PHIL. & PUB. AFF., Spring 1980, at
209, 209–29.
4. Id. at 212.
5. Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 171.
6. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 85–126 (Ben
Brewster trans., 2001); ROBERT PAUL RESCH, ALTHUSSER AND THE RENEWAL OF MARXIST
SOCIAL THEORY passim (1992); Louis Althusser, Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’État
(Notes pour une recherche), LA PENSÉE 151 (1970).
7. In China, see, for example, Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产
党章程) (1969) (China), and State Constitution of 1982, as amended (中华人民共和国宪法)
(1982) (China). In the United States, the U.S. Constitution and, for example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In the U.K., among others, Magna Carta (1215) (England), the Bill of
Rights of 1688 ch. 2, 1 Will. and Mar. Sess. 2 (1689), and the Act of Settlement, 12 & 13, Will.
3 c. 2 (1701).
8. For a germinal discussion, still relevant, see generally, LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); N.S. Timasheff, What is ‘Sociology of Law’?, 43 AM. J. SOC. 225 (1937). See also Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward
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role of ideology9—its deployment in the service of autonomous “fact”
deeply camouflaged within the ideological presumptions of the systems in whose service they are deployed 10—helps manage the framework within which the conception of “what is possible/what is right” 11
is constrained. 12
This effect is particularly evident in the way in which it may be
applied, without much thought for the effect of underlying ideology,
to frame the very question for consideration in this essay. That question will focus on the consequences of an emerging “tension” for settled notions of connection between law systems and the state. This
fundamental “tension” arose as the ideological premises on which the
state system is organized are challenged by non-state actors. On one
side stand a cluster of principles that tie the authenticity and legitimacy
of law to its connection to the state, and that presume an identity between state and law. On the other side stand a growing number of
non-state actors that are developing increasingly robust functional legal orders through which they operate that appear to destabilize the
conceptual order on which the law-state relationship is maintained.
That challenge arrays the premises and ideology of the state and the
state system against two alternatives. The first is an emerging ideology
of a non-state system whose organization, at its limits, might parallel
that of the state system, but which exists beyond it. 13 The second presents as against those two titans, that is of the state and the non-state
actor as organizational centers of law systems, a novel edifice: an
emerging recognition of self-constituting transnational legal orders. 14
a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
9. Cf. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L.

REV. 1276 (1984).
10. See generally JUERGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE & HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy J.
Shapiro trans., 1971). Cf. FLORIAN MENZ, Manipulating Strategies in Newspapers: A Program
for Critical Linguistics, in LANGUAGE, POWER AND IDEOLOGY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 227–50 (Ruth Wodak ed., 1989).
11. Brian Leiter provides an intriguing effort around ideology that itself, through its proffer of legal positivism, tends to expose the underlying ideology of the search for a non-ideological
concept of law. See Brian Leiter, Marx, Law, Ideology, Legal Positivism, 101 VIR. L. REV. 1179
(2015). Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Four Great Errors, in TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, OR, HOW
TO PHILOSOPHIZE WITH A HAMMER (Duncan Large trans., 2009).
12. See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Blackwell 1993).
13. See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (Martin Loughlin, John P. McCormick & Neil
Walker eds., 2012).
14. There has been a substantial amount of writing on this idea of regulatory systems
beyond the traditional law-state nexus. See, e.g., PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL
PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012); GRALF-PETER CALLIESS
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This conflict, and its contradictions, are having a profound effect on
law—in concept and application. 15
Yet, currently, this very construction is possible only within the
confines of the core presumptions of state ideology.16 These ideological blinders perversely make it difficult to see fundamental shifts except
within the premises and analytical constraints of that ideology. In this
case it produces irony—the need to reshape reality to suit the ideological predilections of a system increasingly real only in the past tense,
producing a tendency toward false causation 17 and conceptual confusion. 18 These presumptions bend the emerging realities into the structural presumptions of a global system grounded in the state as the
highest form of coercive (and therefore political) power, legitimated
by a set of presumptions about its use. 19 It assumes the legitimacy of
the hierarchy of power in which organizational and governance capacity proceeds out from the state, delivered in appropriate form (law undertaken within global Rechtsstaat principles) 20 and exercised under
the supervision of instrumentalities of the political or administrative

& PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010); TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2016); Lawrence Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology
of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996).
15. “The nonchalance with which the emergence of the private supply of law has been
endorsed is surprising. This is probably because, in the process of determining what constitutes
law, excessive attention has been traditionally devoted to the recipients of a given rule, while scant
attention has been paid to its suppliers.” Arianna Pretto-Saakmann, Private Suppliers of Law:
Diversity for Lawmakers, 30 VT. L. REV. 921, 936 (2006). See Marc Amstutz, Métissage: On the
Form of Law in World Society, in ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VERGLEICHENDE
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 336–60 (2013).
16. See, e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein, The Inter-State Structure of the Modern World
System, in INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND 87–107 (Ken Booth et al. eds.,
1996); Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W. Mansbach, Political Space and Westphalian States in a
World of Polities: Beyond Inside/Outside, 2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 261, 261–87 (1996).
17. Cf. Nietzsche, supra note 11.
18. See, e.g., Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law Beyond the State?: Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 843–90 (2006).
19. See Larry Catá Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671, 671–732 (2009).
20. Sometimes Rechtsstaat notions are more myth than reality, gesture than substance,
especially in the modern administrative state, where the connection between the polity and the
sources of rules is tenuous at best. See Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter and the
American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171,
171–88 (2009). Europeans understand this at the level of European Union law-politics as the
democratic deficit. See, e.g., Kevin Featherstone, Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in
the European Union, J. COMMON MKT. STUD., June 1994, at 149, 149–70.
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branches of the state apparatus, 21 or those of communities of states organized in international bureaucracies. 22
Such power can be ceded upward (to institutional creatures that
aggregate collections of states international organizations)23 or downward (into corporations or aggregations of civil society actors, religious
organizations and the like that are understood to exist as a subordinate
incarnation of the state). 24 It is exercised through methods (contract,
custom, and the like) that are, by their very definition, inferior in status, form and effect to the forms (i.e. law, regulation, etc.) reserved to
the state and exercisable only under the supervision of and vindicated
through the judicial apparatus of the state. 25 Indeed, in some cases, the
state system finds intolerable the idea of assertions of governance
power in aggregated form outside of the body of the corporate organization of the state itself. 26 Consequently, all power falling outside of
this framework can be suppressed as illegitimate and as a threat to the
global social order. In a way that reflects the scientific development of
“harmonious society” principles of Chinese political organization, 27
21. Criticized in NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST
STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010).
22. See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS
(2006); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15.
23. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers, in INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAWMAKING: ON PUBLIC
AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 3–33 (Armin von
Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke eds., 2012); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act
Through Formal International Organizations, 42(1) J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 3–32 (1998).
24. See, e.g., HARVEY FEIGENBAUM, CHRIS HAMNETT & JEFFREY R. HENIG,
SHRINKING THE STATE: THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIVATIZATION 5–34 (1998);
Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91–112 (Rodney Bruce Hall et al. eds., Cambridge 2002). For a criticism
from the perspective of the protections of public law, see, for example, James M. Cooper, The
Rise of Private Actors Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 33 WIS. L.J. 470, 474–88, 502–10 (2015);
Robert Koulish, Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 462, 466–76 (2008); Tally Kritzman-Amir, Privatization and Delegation of State Authority
in Asylum Systems, 5 L. & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 194, 194–215 (2011); Harold J. Sullivan, Privatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
461, 461–67 (1987).
25. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 499, 499–523 (2008).
26. See COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO: UNA MIRADA DESDE CUBA (Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, ed., Editorial Caminos 2011).
27. Harmonious Society, Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, (Sept. 29, 2007), http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html; Larry
Catá Backer, Studying the “Higher Law” of Scientific Development (科学发展观) in Chinese
State-Party Constitutionalism, Law at the End of the Day (July 5, 2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/07/studying-higher-law-of-scientific.html.
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the ideological presumptions of the state system permit the construction of a space for outlaw enterprises whose organization, methods and
norms fall outside the law; that is, they fall outside the organizational
parameters of hierarchy and control centered in the state. 28
It is in this constructing sense that much of the debate about the
rise of governance orders outside of the state is framed. Its object is
either to recognize the rise of such orders but then tame them within
the hierarchical ordering systems of the state, or to identify their methods of governance and then seek to transform them, or vouch for them
as law. Much like efforts to include marriage between people of the
same sex within traditional marriage systems, the transnational governance debate at times seems singularly focused on proving that such
systems are either just like or compatible with the state system (something, for example, at the heart of recent efforts to incorporate rules
for sovereign wealth funds) 29 or that they can be made so by either
broadening the current understanding of important terms—like law—
or characterizing these systems as somehow still attached to the state.
The “tension,” then, which is usually identified as the heart of the
conflicts both between state and private actors and among the two and
the emerging “transnational system” (understood perhaps best in its
methodological context), 30 is grounded in the need to domesticate governance rules outside the state, or to bring their methods more conventionally within the methodological hierarchies of rulemaking. In
either case, the state remains the supreme legitimating organization,
and the law remains the most legitimate expression of binding authority. At the heart of the tension is the issue of self-constitution. 31 Within
the presumptions of state ideology, self-constitution is impossible, except as a political and perhaps religious act.32 All tension disappears

28. Larry Catá Backer, The Drama Of Corporate Law: Narrator Between Policy And
Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1111, 1146–64 (2009) (reviewing DAVID A. WESTBROOK,

BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION (2007)).
29. Generally Accepted Principles and Practices: “Santiago Principles,”
INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (Oct. 2008),
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
30. Cf. Peer Zumbansen, Why Global Law is Transnational: Remarks on the Symposium
Around William Twining’s Montesquieu Lecture, 4 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 463, 463–
475 (2013).
31. Gunther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the
Nation State, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DEMISE OR
TRANSMUTATIONISM? (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
32. Though even here, the autonomy of religion as against political acts remains in doubt.
Consider in this context the furious effort to avoid recognition of some strains of Islam as too
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when private and transnational systems bend their knee to the state,
even as the state might be required to bend a bit, like the feudal French
monarchs, in acknowledgment of the now ceded (and thus regularized)
authority of its vassals.
This essay considers the tension between public and private governance in the emerging transnational legal order. The focus of examination is the corporation, where this tension is most evident. The
analysis starts with the greatest structural impediment to the consideration of the tension between public and private in the transnational
ordering of the corporation—the ideology of the state order, which
disguises alternative governance orders and the governments through
which they are operationalized. It is with the effects of the ideology of
the state order that the analytical limitations of analysis become
clearer, which is the object of Section II. More importantly, the exposure of the ideology of the state reveals the extent to which it can bend
the objectives of analysis from one that follows reality on the ground
to one that takes and bends that reality around the state. That bending
can produce substantial effects on the structure of debate and the possibilities for understanding institutional changes in behavior that quite
directly challenge the normative presumptions of the privileged ideology. This effect can be exaggerated when changes appear to threaten
the hierarchies built into governing ideologies.
Sections III and IV explore the power of ideology in framing analysis in Gunther Teubner’s conception of the reality of self-constitutionalizing organization outside the state and in Peer Zumbansen’s excellent theorizing of transnational law as a method. Both suggest the
ways in which the ideologies of framing analysis can color both the way
in which relationships are understood and the objectives of analysis are
formed. Section V posits an alternative analysis, freer (though not entirely free) of the orbit of the state, a vision possible only when the
ideological presumptions of the state are suspended. It serves as a foundation for a manifesto of law beyond nation and law. 33

violent or intolerant to be recognized as “legitimate” expressions of religious will. These ideological blinders were much in evidence as changes in religious expressions were conflated with
Western political expression to change its complexion from religious to political expression. See,
e.g., Peter W. Rodman, Policy Brief: Co-opt or Confront Fundamentalist Islam?, MIDDLE E. Q.
(1994), http://www.meforum.org/201/policy-brief-co-opt-or-confront-fundamentalist.
33. See Larry Catá Backer, Remarks made at the Launch Symposium of the Dickson
Poon Transnational Law Institute, Transnational Law: What’s in a Name?, BEYOND NATION
AND LAW: A MANIFESTO: BACKER-IN-LAW, http://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/BeyondNationLawManifesto.pdf.
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II. T HE I DEOLOGY OF THE S TATE AND THE P ROBLEM OF
N ON -S TATE G OVERNANCE

Gunther Teubner once asked: “after deconstruction, what is left of
law as a hierarchy of rules, founded on a political constitution, endowed with an institutional identity, based on the distinction between
legislation and adjudication and legitimated through democratic representation and constitutional rights?” 34 He suggested that “should we
search for it in the direction of a ‘polycontextual’ law that would not
be hierarchical, but heterarchical, a law with multiple sources, a law
without a unifying perspective, a law that is produced by different mutually exclusive discourses in society?” 35 Yet that poly-contextualism
remains hidden under the veils of the presumptions of the ideologies
that support the state system of political organization. But more important than the presumptions of state ideology are the methodological techniques used to support them in a way that hides both their presence and the organizational priorities they represent. One of the great
perversions of the 21st century is the merger of ideology and social
scientism. 36 This perversion arises in the way in which each hides its
effects on the other, and that they together seek to present something
that is both neutral and natural. 37
Ideology provides the cluster of basic assumptions and parameters
that define the scope of reality—that is, they define the boundaries
within which any sort of investigation, including social scientific investigations, may be organized. More importantly, it suggests the boundaries within which analysis of the data produced through the application of social scientism can be understood, explained, and applied.
Social scientism, much in vogue in most universities and among the
social scientific disciplines, combines a mania for empiricism with an
underlying absolute belief in the neutrality and unassailability of numbers. If some matter can be reduced to an equation—that is, to a set of
34. Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy, 31(4) L. & SOC’Y REV. 763, 763 (1997).
35. Id. at 777. See also Gotthard Günther, Life as Poly-Contextuality, in Beiträge zur
Grundlegung einer operationsfähigen Dialektik I. (Gotthard Günther ed., Harnburg: Meiner
1976); Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’ 11 Cardozo L.
Rev. 920, 920–1046 (1990).
36. There is a parallel discussion in the natural sciences as well. See, e.g., Austin L.
Hughes, The Folly of Scientism, THE NEW ATLANTIS (Fall 2002), http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-folly-of-scientism.
37. For the germinal critique, see FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE COUNTERREVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES ON THE ABUSE OF REASON (Liberty Fund 1980) (1952).
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mathematically arranged relationships—and if those relationships can
then be illuminated through the substitution of numbers (serving as a
proxy for reality) into the symbolic representation of relationships represented by the formula, then the resulting product must, in the social
“scientist’s” mind, necessarily be reality. Combined, ideology and social scientism provide first the palette of assumption from which one
can construct numerical relationships and then the numerical relationships themselves that seem to prove the underlying ideological assumptions on the basis of which the numerical relationships were produced in the first place. The inevitable tautology that is the product of
this inherently powerful but circular reasoning tends to be hidden because the premises of social scientism in the service of ideology are
never transparent. Assumptions in the construction of numerical relationships are crafted as second order propositions. Each is itself the
inevitable choice that follows from the ideological framework from
which an empirical study arises. As a consequence, it seems, social scientism is built on the proposition that the thing can prove itself, with
science providing merely a legitimating technique.
This tautology and its ideology-enhancing character might be illustrated with a small but telling example. The ideology of the state is
currently pervasive. It posits that the state (and those multi-state entities, created by and which serve the interests of, states) is the highest
expression of political will, and holds a monopoly of power over individuals and things. Though it may be constrained in the deployment
of that power, such constraints merely emphasize the all-encompassing
nature of state power. State power is evidenced by law that is itself both
an object that can only be created by states and that cannot exist apart
from the state. Law is accorded a singularly important place in the ordering and control of human and institutional behavior and is itself
legitimated both from its relationship to the state and from the conformity of its creation to those rules which states have agreed serve as
a marker of legitimate production (rule of law ideals). Yet states are not
the only entities that create rules that bind people and other groups,
and the state is not the only enterprise that produces rules that are
obeyed. Even the absence of a state does not necessarily produce chaos
or anarchy; that absence is measured against the ideal of the state. 38
Indeed, the ideology of the state requires that those rules be denominated by another name—both to distinguish them from the products
38. Ken Menkhaus, Governance Without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping, INT’L SEC., Winter 2006/2007, at 74, 74–106.

10

BACKER.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1]

3/1/2017 6:23 PM

The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational Law

of states and to situate them within a hierarchy of obedience that is
meant to be somewhere below that of state produced “law.” Where
there was a complete identity between territory and rulemaking, it was
possible to maintain a working allegiance to this ideology without creating tension between ideology and reality. But in the face of globalization, there are now spaces where the only rules that bind are those
produced by groups and entities that are neither states nor other organs of collective state power. 39 Yet the ideology of the state produces
in the social scientists, and the lawyer, a blindness to the consequences,
where that blindness is necessary to preserve the power of the ideology
to order reality. And so, in the service of the state, for example, social
scientism may be called in to survey the paucity of law with respect to
a particular governance area—grounding that survey on the distinctions between the rule-products of states and other rules. The result
will necessarily show both the paucity of law and the need to extend
law to those governance areas where it is absent. But that conclusion
must necessarily follow from the presumptions of state ideology that
posit both the necessity of law and the basis for regulation and the rule
of the state in the production of law.
More importantly, perhaps, the ideology of the state also serves as
a powerful force in the construction of taxonomies of rules that, in
turn, serve to reinforce the ideological consequences of state supremacy. 40 The techniques of illegitimacy, devolution, management, mimicry and hybridity are usually deployed to contain or absorb behaviors
that may be contrary to, or threaten, state ideology. Rules, other than
those produced by states as law are, of necessity, incapable of serving
their intended purpose and must be illegitimate. 41 Their illegitimacy
39. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY:
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003) (“Today,
forces of globalization and privatization are relocating the boundary between private and public
authority in international commercial relations and creating new opportunities for private, corporate actors to exercise power and influence.” Id., at 1). This is recognized even by international
organizations, though in that case, efforts are made to keep these non-state zones quite constrained. See Larry Catá Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility in Weak Governance Zones,
14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 297 (2016). See also, Nicola Dalla Guarda, Governing the Ungov-

ernable: International Relations, Transnational Cybercrime Law, and the Post-Westphalian
Regulatory State, 6 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 211, 211–49 (2015).
40. J.P. Nettl, The State as a Conceptual Vehicle, in THE STATE: CRITICAL CONCEPTS
VOLUME: 1, 9–36 (John A. Hall ed., Routledge 1994). See also Accordance with International

Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010
I.C.J. 403 (July 22).
41. Pierrick Le Goff, Global Law: A Legal Phenomenon Emerging from the Process of
Globalization, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 127–31 (2007).
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derives, in part, from their failure to conform to the ideological requisites for legitimate lawmaking. Alternatively, these rules are understood as being devolved from the state—that is, they are a species of
law precisely because the state permitted their operationalization
within their respective territories through law. 42 In another variation,
rules are understood to be a necessary tool of the state in the management of its operation. 43 In this sense, rulemaking is not merely devolved (and as such serves as a species of law), but is also managed for
the particular ends to which states may find useful. Markets are the
best example of this form of ideological re-framing. Management also
suggests yet another alternative technique of absorption into state ideology—the notion of mimicry. 44 Anything outside the framing assumptions of state ideology are understood as legitimate, and measured by their conformity to the forms and practices of state-based law.
Rule systems are constituted, rules are produced under rule of law
frameworks, and—most importantly—rule systems constructed as legitimate under the characterization of mimicry extend legitimacy to
non-state systems to the extent of that mimicry. Mimicry itself can be
understood as a process—it serves as a means of transition from outside
to inside the ideology of the state. There is an element of the transitory
in some governance literature, guided, to some extent, by the notion
that private governance is a step towards the absorption of private governance within the state system at the national or international level.
Most positive views of soft law, for example, are premised on the assumption that they serve as a way station to the construction of traditional and legitimate hard law, incorporated within the traditionally
understood domestic legal orders of states.
Lastly, and most hopefully, state ideology in its arguably most sophisticated form suggests that rule making outside the state forms an
expressive component of a more complex hybrid system in which law
is made from the interaction of rulemaking systems inside and outside
the state. 45 One form of this approach suggests hybridity through the
42. See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 619–26 (2007).
43. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:

TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101–31 (1992) (putting forward the concept of
enforced self-regulation in a complex interplay between the state as regulatory manager and industry).
44. See Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems
of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 1–29 (2003).
45. See CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 14.
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construction of public-private networks, where functionally differentiated groups of actors with governance power informally organize
themselves and then manage vertically oriented national governance
through horizontal transnational networks. 46 Sometimes these hybrid
systems have an institutional component, focusing on the use of public-private partnerships on an inter-governmental model of organization and rule making. 47 This provides a tentative step forward—the
definition of law is expanded. But it also keeps one foot very much
within the traditional ideological framework. The purpose of hybridity
is to buttress “law” and to reinforce its hegemony. 48 But law’s hegemony also serves to reinforce hegemony of the state—it brings governance into law and therefore into the state. 49 Yet there is a subversive
element here as well—for just as a project to expand the definition of
law into hybrid contexts can serve to discipline non-state rule making
within the ideology of the state, so might it also serve to move beyond
that ideology by detaching law from its firm anchorage within the
state. If law can be hybridized, then it also might be applied to those
organs of rulemaking that are not the state, and in so doing may attach
law to non-state governments—like multi-national corporations. 50
Taxonomies are important not merely for producing an organization of “things” that makes the world and the relationship among such
“things” easier to order and understand. They also, by doing precisely
what they were meant to do, produce the structures through which
ideology can be applied and reified within the fact-producing universe
of social scientism. Yet in doing so, they also expose the contingency
of social science’s “facts.” And thus, the ultimate power of facts, in the
form of relationships derived from data generation and proven by the
reduction of behaviors to the accumulation of relational record keeping, is not merely to reinforce ideology by masquerading as something
46. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 131–52 (2004).
47. Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order,
18(2) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 751–802 (2011).
48. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1017–45
(2004).
49. PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds.,
St. U. of N.Y. Press, 1999).
50. Larry Catá Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview and Application
of Interactions Between Law-State and Governance-Corporate Systems, in BEYOND
TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 87
(Gunther Handl et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012).
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they are not—facts existing beyond the context of the knowledge structures through which they are produced—but in managing those who
are the recipients of this information (politicians, lawyers, the public,
technocrats, etc.). And that, of course, is the ultimate purpose not of
data-driven social scientism, but of the ideology in the service of which
such scientism is necessarily deployed. 51
Thus, consider the problem of the “fact” of the corporation. Something that is on its surface easy to discern becomes impossibly problematic once conflicting ideological structures are brought to bear on
the question. If one were to adhere strictly to the ideology of the state,
the corporation could not exist except as a reflection of the state. This
is certainly the fundamental understanding in Stalinist and Maoist
Marxist Leninism. The Cuban Marxists understand the corporation as
the state in its form, but detached for use in particular purposes. 52 In
the West, this notion heavily influences the idea that corporations are
no more than the receptacle of privileges given by the state in whose
service they are to be used. This “fact” produces significant consequences—from the judgment that corporations may have only such
constitutional privileges as derived from constitutional rights-bearing
beings (the idea commonly held in European human rights jurisprudence), or that such rights are limited to the protection of the property
of such being held in corporate form (once an important measure in
the United States), or that the corporation cannot be more than property in the hands of its shareholders (a view still widely held in the
United States). The ideological structure influences the focus of vision.
So focused, social scientism can be deployed, for example in the form
of so-called “Chicago School” or “Law and Economics” empiricism, 53
producing facts driven by and in the service of the ideological presumptions from which they derive. The same, of course, applies to the
institutional ideologies of globalization that have recently provided a
challenge to the state-based ideology of corporate organization.54
51. Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the Governance
Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 114–22 (2008).
52. VI Congreso del Partido Cominiosta de Cuba, Lineamientos de la política económica
y social del partido y la Revolución (April 18, 2011), https://www.scribd.com/doc/55084818/Fol-

leto-Lineamientos-VI-Congreso-Partido-Comunista-de-Cuba.
53. See Robert P. Murphy, The Chicago School versus the Austrian School, MISES
INSTITUTE (June 20, 2011), https://mises.org/library/chicago-school-versus-austrian-school.
For a history, see, for example, Robin I. Mordfin & Marsha Ferziger Nagorsky, Chicago and
Law and Economics: A History, THE RECORD: U. CHICAGO ALUMNI MAGAZINE (Fall 2011),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall11/lawandecon-history.
54. JAN BROEKMAN & LARRY CATÁ BACKER, LAWYERS MAKING MEANING: THE

14

BACKER.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1]

3/1/2017 6:23 PM

The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational Law

This is not to suggest that technique or methodology in social sciences plays no useful role or that the equation-and-data driven relationships developed through empirical modeling are necessarily unreliable—or worse, inevitably misleading. Rather, it serves to emphasize
the instrumental character of data-driven analysis, an instrumental
character that is inevitable and inevitably tied to the presumptions of
the ideology that data serves. If one starts from the assumption that
states are the legitimate center of political power organized most legitimately as Western style participatory republics, then all data driven
analysis will be driven by these premises—in the conceptualization of
data that is relevant or significant, in the construction of posited relationships, and in the interpretation of the data that is recognized and
then harvested. More importantly, it also serves as a reminder of the
instrumental character of qualitative analysis of social science research.
This is especially the case where one frames the question for analysis.
Back, then, to the tautology tying norm and technique: ideology ensures that one frames the question in the appropriate way. Producing
the right question is more important than extracting an answer from
the wrong question. Where issues of governance and law are central—
framing the question to comport with ideological presumptions, that
is, framing the discourse in a way in which the state remains at the
center—it is difficult to escape the orbit of the state, even when the
subject is the possibility of decentering the state itself.
The connection between norm and technique serves to remind us
of the need for caution in the use of these techniques and of their inherent limits. Empiricism produces knowledge of fact-as-fact; it provides a basis for understanding the character of a thing as “fact” in relation to that to which it relates and from which it can be distinguished
to some end (e.g., wheat-corn; red-white, flower-leaf, etc.). But facts
are meaningless out of this relational context—that is, they cannot be
identified usefully and are unknowable as “fact.” But usefulness is a
matter of the ideological structures around which facts are developed
(are two things ever identical? Two snowflakes versus two flakes of
commercially produced cereal). Something does not rise to the conscious level of fact unless it is understood as such, and that understanding is only possible within the reality-framing assumptions of ideology.
To speak about “law” and the “state,” then, is to understand these

SEMIOTICS OF LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION II 155–80 (Springer, 2013).
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terms within an ideological structure that situates and privileges certain constructions and not others; data-driven analysis that accepts the
ideological premises of the state will necessarily not merely reproduce
it, but will inevitably serve to strengthen its premises by the very application of those premises in the service of data generation and interpretation. While this is useful to answer questions such as whether the
ideology remains useful, serves its ends, has deviated from its position
and purpose, it serves less well to either identify or relate to facts and
ideas outside of the ideological construct from which it arises.

III. F ROM G OVERNANCE B EYOND G OVERNMENT TO
G OVERNMENT W ITHOUT THE STATE
Globalization has provided a governance framework environment
marked by a fracturing and diffusing of power beyond political actors.
Though the state remains very much alive and continues to be powerful within the ambit of its authority, its claim to a monopoly of governance power—either directly or through public organs at the supraor infra- national levels—is no longer plausible. This environment
nurtures functionally differentiated communities of actors who together form closed self-regulating and autonomous governing systems
that are not centered on any state, though perhaps are ultimately connected to states. These are governance systems at the heart of what
Gunther Teubner describes as polycentric globalization.55 This is not
merely the sum of the privatization of governmental functions, common in assessments of polycentricity within the European Union governance framework, 56 but the substitution and/or supplementation of
state authority by private organs, self-contained and self-referential, in
which the state plays an incidental role. Prominent among these have

55. Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company Constitutions
Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF

CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
JURIDIFICATION 203 (Rainer Nickel ed., Hart, Oxford 2009).
56. Thus, it is not uncommon to “conceptualise the emerging field of European spatial
policy discourse as an attempt to produce a new framework of spatialities—of regions within
member states, transnational mega-regions, and the EU as a spatial entity—which disrupts the
traditional territorial order, and destabilises spatialities within European member states. The new
transnational orientation creates new territories of control, expressed through the new transnational spatial vision of polycentricity and mobility.” OLE B. JENSEN & TIM RICHARDSON,
MAKING EUROPEAN SPACE: MOBILITY, POWER AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITY 44 (2004).

16

BACKER.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1]

3/1/2017 6:23 PM

The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational Law

been the rise of internally complete systems of operations of multinational corporations and their suppliers. 57 In an advanced form, they
may even merge public and private actors within a system that is neither, in which an intimate and sustained interaction as equals produces
something altogether different. 58 Within this framework, even nonstate actors acquire recognition as entities burdened with public obligations—for example, to observe international human right norms. 59
Significant in this respect are the current United Nations–sponsored
efforts to “operational[ize]” a regulatory framework imposing a direct
obligation on multinational corporations to respect human rights. 60
Governance authority has indeed leaked past the confines of the authority of public organs and, now reconfigured, includes actors other
than states.
But has this nascent Umwertung aller Werte (“revaluation of all
values”) 61 of state power also produced a space within which governance is possible without government and, directly or indirectly, the
state? Is it possible to point to systems of government that have
achieved escape velocity from the state (and law systems) or even its
proxies at the international level? Despite all of the great announcements of the end of the state or of law as the basic organizing principle
of power within a defined territory, the state remains at the center of
most discussion of governance. Even if no longer necessarily the only
source of authority, the state is not absent from even the most polycentric or state rejecting system advocated as an overcoming of that
enterprise. 62 In a simpler time (about a generation ago) the fictional
divisions into which social, cultural and legal life were segmented were
both simple and powerful methods for the organization of communal
57. See Backer, supra note 25.
58. Sovereign wealth funds provide a good example, the Norwegian Pension Fund
Global, in particular. See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Rule of Law Building: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1–122 (2013).
59. See Joint Statement to the UN Human Rights Council, World Bank and Other In-

ternational Financial Institutions Must Uphold Human Rights in all Activities They Support,

GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://globalinitiative-escr.org/the-world-bank-and-other-international-financial-institutionsmust-uphold-human-rights-in-all-activities-they-support/.
60. Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014).
61. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE (Walter Kaufmann trans., Viking Press 1968) (1888).
62. Inger-Johanne Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to Constitutionalism, in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 41–65 (Christian Joerges et al.
eds., Hart Publishing 2004).
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life. Demarcation was especially straightforward with respect to the
construction and control of fictional persons, especially fictional actors
organized for conducting economic activity.
Like Athena, born fully formed from out of the head of Zeus, these
juridical persons were said to be given form by the state, under whose
rules these entities were “organized.” While some might argue that
these corporate or entity charters gave these fictive entities life, it
might be more useful to think of state charters as granting economic
entities certain rights and obligations in the public sphere. These entities exist in the form of their internal organization and connections
among their principle stakeholders, but can claim the public rights of
natural persons only to the extent that the public authorities permit it.
In the absence of those permissions, these entities exist only as private
arrangements (through contract) rather than as public juridical persons
(through law).
As the state served as the source of the public character of the entity, only that law could be said to impose general obligations on the
stakeholders intimately connected with the governance of the organization. Specific obligations, of course, remained a vital part of private
law through contract. But these specific obligations gave no rights as
against the entity to others. Nor was the corporation obligated to comply with behavior norms with respect to its conduct or governance beyond those mandated by the state through law. All of this was in accord
with the core of rechtsstaat notions and substantive constitutional law
principles that flared out like a sort of legal supernova at the conclusion
of the last World War in 1945. Moral obligations were consigned to
marketing departments. Just as states had no obligation and little incentive to comply with hortatory international declarations, corporations and other juridical persons had little incentive to comply with
norms that were not imposed by law, nor to acknowledge the power of
purported stakeholders with no legal connection to the entity. Governance, in effect, was firmly grounded in government.
But this simple notion of state, law, and juridical persons, of governance and government, has been undergoing substantial changes
over the last quarter century. 63 Governance is no longer purely the

63. See Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United
Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 308–27
(2005).
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province of government, though it has not abandoned the state entirely. Contract, moral obligations, and communal consensus expressed in otherwise non-binding instruments have begun to assert a
regulatory power far in excess of the extent of their formal effect in law
within a system in which only legitimately enacted state measures are
vested with a power to demand conformity and which may be enforced
through the instrumentalities of the state. But this is a complicated
process, messy and not clearly headed toward “success” in the conventional sense. 64 The regulation of the internet has been a well-known
example, both in the context of national 65 and transnational 66 regulation. The proliferation of private standard setting bodies is another. 67
Gunther Teubner recently reminded us of the complexity and tentative nature of the process. 68 Professor Teubner starts with a contradiction: the defeat of labor in its bid for formal and significant status
as a corporate governance stakeholder through the German co-determination law by notions of corporate governance has not directed
power back to shareholders or directors, but rather, in the form of corporate codes, might have pushed power elsewhere “with a potential
that is hard to gauge.” 69 Teubner lays the blame for this contradiction
on the dynamics of globalization. “A strategy in which the pressure
amassed by worldwide social conflicts, protest movements, domestic
courts, non-governmental and international organisations, coerces
multinationals into adopting codes of conduct in which they assume an
obligation to uphold social standards, is more likely to succeed.”70
Yet this is an odd statement, for these codes have no legal effect,

64. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, A Lex Mercatoria for Corporate Social Responsibility
Codes Without the State?: On the Regulatory Character of Private Corporate Codes, 23 IND. J.

GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, ___ (2016).
65. On national context, see, for example, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Malte Ziewitz,
Jefferson Rebuffed: The United States And The Future of Internet Governance, 8 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 188, 188–228 (2007). For the contemporary debate, encryption provides an
example.
66. On transnational context, see LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR
INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014); JOHN MATHIASON, INTERNET GOVERNANCE: THE NEW
FRONTIER OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS (2009); MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND
STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2010).
67. See, e.g., Harm Schepel, Constituting Private Governance Regimes: Standards Bodies in American Law, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 161–88
(Christian Joerges et al. eds., Hart Pub. 2004).
68. Teubner, supra note 55.
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id.
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except perhaps as contract (and in many places and under most circumstances even the contract model is a stretch).
Legal aspects of the codes of conduct appear only at the periphery;
that is to say, these codes occupy a juridical “no-man’s land”. As soft
law, they are not enforceable; instead, they morally oblige companies.
Everything depends on political relationships, namely, the pressure
exerted by the leading actors and the mobilisation of the public. 71

Still, the contradictions of “soft law” that exhibit critical characteristics of “hard” law require examination. And thus, Teubner proposes
a thesis: “that corporate codes are emergent legal phenomena in the
constitutionalisation of private governance regimes. Unlike when they
were first spawned, they are no longer mere public relations strategies;
instead, they have matured into genuine civil constitutions – in the
fashion of constitutional pluralism.” 72 Teubner advances five factors
contributing to the evolution of soft law regimes, of governance without government. These include what he calls, “(I) Juridification; (II)
Constitutionalisation; (III) Judicialisation; (IV) Hybridisation; and (V)
Intermeshing.” 73What is not clear is whether these factors have produced governance without government—that is, the rise of fictive governance that supports fictive entities beyond the control of the state
(itself a fiction but one with quite a sting)— or whether it has produced
a method for the rise of intergovernmental governance—that is, of
public governance through private actors.
Juridification suggests, for Teubner, the quite correct insight that
the notion of soft law is itself no longer useful as either descriptor or
concept. The notion essentially “beg[s] the same question as lex mercatoria, internet law and other global regimes in which private actors
make rules, the binding nature of which is not guaranteed by state
power, yet which display a high normative efficacy.” 74 And here one
comes to the great conundrum of transitions in law and the assumptions of legal regimes: global political systems worked so hard through
two centuries from the time of the French Revolution to the destruction of the Nazi Regime in Germany, to cement the notion (in both
higher law and statute) that under the rule of law, grounded in legitimate state power, law assumes a central place as a legitimate expression
of popular will, and popular will is the critical foundation for legitimate
71.
72.
73.
74.
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action. But at the moment of its global triumph, this system of law
appears upended by the semblance of law without the foundations in
legitimacy. In short form—when academics and politicians, confronted with the realities of governance through instruments like corporate codes, ask what tends to be the standard question “is this law?,”
they are signaling in shorthand a very different question: is this a legitimate expression of governance or merely a private arrangement of no
interest as law?
Teubner thus looks for another basis of legitimation, one “which
self-perpetuates by recycling symbolic global (not national) validity.
The first criterion, binary code, distinguishes global law from economic and other social processes. The second criterion, global validity,
differentiates between national and international legal phenomena.” 75
Still, Teubner concedes, not every code, or every expression of aspiration, is worthy of the moniker law. He draws on Martin Herberg’s formalist construction (if it mimics law it may be law) approach. 76 Formalism, it seems, leads to functional effect, or at least to comfort, but
not enough without a certain level of institutionalization. Law must
not merely be complete, it must exist within a differentiated sphere in
which its own autonomy is grounded in its own will. In other words,
the juridical personality must assume the autonomy of that ultimate
autonomous personality, the state, if it is to make law beyond that state.
A ‘global law without a state’ should not yet be assumed upon the
basis that non-state institutions judge behaviour pursuant to the normative code, but, rather, that it may be acknowledged only when processes which observe these judicial functions under the binary legal
code have been institutionalised. Only then do corporate codes satisfy the structural pre-requisites of a transnational law outside of state
law. 77

This requires juridification—a self-reflexive mechanism for enforcement and elaboration.
This reflexive process requires certain institutional precautions, in
particular, the development of actors or instances, who or which are
responsible for the establishment, modification, interpretation and

75. Id.
76. Id. at 3–4 (citing Martin Herberg, Private Authority, Global Governance and the Law:
The Case of Environmental Self-Regulation, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW 146
(Gerd Winter ed., Cambridge U. Press 2006)).
77. Teubner, supra note 55, at 5.
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implementation of the primary norm formation. Fundamental to this
is the growth of the central level of internal control and implementation organs, which mediates between the two other normative levels, thusly grounding the legal character of the corporate code. 78

Thus, the form of law may be contract—the essence of soft law in
the 21st century 79—but the function is regulatory within a contractually elaborated governance system. 80 But juridification requires a
higher law that can serve as framework both for regulation and as the
process basis for a legitimate application of process rule of law. In other
words, as Teubner elaborates, juridification requires constitutionalization. 81 However, for Teubner, “this occurs only when the reflexive
processes in the organisations are appended to reflexive legal processes—in other words, when inter-systemic linking institutions tie together secondary rule-making in the law with fundamental, rational
principles of the organisation.” 82 This idea of auto-constitutionalization suggests that the “will to organization” of states, memorialized in
constitutions, can migrate, and legitimately so, to non-state entities.
This is based upon a constitutional concept which is not limited to
nation states constitutions, but which, instead requires that, under
particular historical conditions, even non-state civic orders give birth
to autonomous constitutionalisation. The positivisation of constitutional norms moves from the global political level to various social
sectors, which, in parallel to political constitutions, produce their
own constitutions of civil society. 83

The idea, increasingly accepted among international actors, is that
constitutions of states are not too unique to states. Instead, any juridical person might also acquire a certain legitimacy as a regulatory entity
by mimicking states. “We can observe the typical components of a constitution: regulations about the establishment and functioning of decision-making processes (organisational and procedural rules), and the

78. Id.
79. Backer, supra note 25, at 499.
80. See Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of
Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1774–83
(2007).
81. But not the other way around. This is well reasoned in GUNTHER TEUBNER,
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION
102–03 (Oxford, 2012) (and generally chapter 4–5).
82. Teubner, supra note 55, at 5–6.
83. Id.
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codification of the boundaries of the organisation in relation to individual freedoms and civil liberties (basic rights).” 84
But neither juridification nor constitutionalization are enough for
more than “independent law-formation.” 85 If this was all there was to
the corporate codes of multinational entities, then the academic debate
would center on whether these entities constitute new forms of states.
That is an anachronistic position—suggesting a return to the age of
the Hudson’s Bay Company and antique mercantilism, rather than to
grasp the subtleties of the current movement. Teubner, though, suggests the necessity of structural coupling 86 with national systems. Multinational codes may be autonomous, but they exist in a networked
community of law and power. States still control territory, and multinational corporations manifest their activity within territories.
For the implementation success of codes of conduct, their judicialisation in the national legal order will be one of the most important
pre-requisites. At the same time, it should be clear that their reception in national law is not a condition of the legal character or binding
effect of the codes. 87

For Teubner, the key still lies in globalization, but here understood
as international judicialization. He explains: “The corporate codes are
neither prescribed by national legislation, nor adopted, nor integrated.
More pertinent is the notion of conflict of laws: the autonomous legal
orders of the multinationals collide with national and international
laws. In this collision between autonomous legal orders, both undergo
a deep process of change.” 88 What is described is not merely a process
of communication, but of a pattern of exchange that is necessarily
grounded on the autonomy of the actors. The coupling of these autonomous systems, their communication, is structural, that is built into
their structures of autonomy and that structures the way in which they
respond to the actions of other systems.
Structural coupling is not merely communicative, or interactive, it
is also dynamic: “there is a reciprocal reconstruction of the state law in
the corporate code and vice versa.” 89 When it rebounds, it changes all
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id. at 8.
86. On structural coupling, see, for example, Anders Esmark, The Functional Differentiation of Governance: Public Governance Beyond Hierarchy, Market and Networks, 87 PUB.
ADMIN. 351, 351–70 (2009).
87. Teubner, surpa note 55, at 8.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id.
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meta-system participants. But, of course, there is more to this.
Teubner suggests within this notion a further layering of judicialization. This time, not in the service of the construction of an autonomous system, but instead as a meta-nexus point where structural coupling or systemic interactions may be bureaucratized within a
legitimacy-producing institution:
Here, we are concerned with regime-transcending legal conflicts,
with effects in both legal orders. The only escape route in such a case
of inter-regime conflict would be for the tribunal concerned to develop its own substantive norms. Mindful of the “domestic” and the
“foreign” legal order, and with one eye on the third order, trans-institutional substantive norms, following the fashion of an asymmetrical law-mélange, could be formed. 90

This is certainly the framework that has emerged as the form of
bureaucratization, par excellence, for legitimacy producing communication among systems above the state. In the West, the judge has again
assumed the role as both Hebrew prophet and Greek oracle.91 “Thus,
the most pressing task might be the organisation of mutual awareness
and reciprocal acknowledgment between decentralised tribunals.” 92
Teubner has now moved us from the creation of a law-state conventionally understood as derived from the state as the supreme legal
person, to the possibility of the creation of governance-communities
that are not states, but nevertheless acquire a legitimate form through
constitutionalist organization and which exist autonomous of the state.
But can the corporation, in the context of its great codification projects, pull away from the orbit of the state and its traditional law to
become its own autonomous governance unit? There is always a danger, Teubner relates, that such codes will become little more than the
privatized expression of public law. 93 Already there is a great tendency
among Western states to engage in privatized lawmaking. 94 The
boundaries of the public and private sphere are sometimes blurred, not
90. Id. at 9.
91. See Larry Catá Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Courts, Law
and the Interpretive Process, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291, 315–38 (2000); Larry Catá
Backer, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 132–44 (2003).
92. Teubner, surpa note 55, at 9.
93. Id. at 9–10.
94. On this point, see, GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH
CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE, supra note 14, at 153–247. See also David V. Snyder, Private
Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 378–402 (2003); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324–30 (2002).
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at the insistence of power-seeking private juridical persons, but at the
insistence of states that seek to privatize their governmental responsibilities. 95 These present a more discrete method of governance. 96
Instead, the hybridisation of the corporate codes is a developmental
trend, in which the autonomy of the codes is preserved, but in which
state agencies and international organisations are involved to the extent that they contribute to the delineation of the borders of the private code and to its implementation and regulation. 97

Ironically, the success of this strategy might well serve as a barometer of state power vis-a-vis their corporate regulatory competitors.
Teubner, however, is not altogether optimistic about the ability of
corporate code projects to reach escape velocity and detach from the
orbital control of the states in which they operate. Or, more precisely,
to reach that escape velocity in a way capable of being seen as legitimate by competing governance organs. To work around this tension,
Teubner suggests an approach grounded in what he calls “intermeshing.” 98 Intermeshing involves the Europeanization of multinational
regulatory enterprises. Just as the Member States of the European Union together might create broader and more powerfully effective crossstate norms, so too might multinational “states” do the same within
cooperative regulatory communities. Thus, Teubner notes “the emergence of inter-company networks as an extension of the corporate code
onto an entire production network. Global commodity chains have developed, which constitute neither market relationships nor integrated
multinationals.” 99 These are “networks of independent companies,
which have generated their own governance structures.” 100 Here is the
model of the European Union in a privatized variant form!
Despite the audacious scope of his newly asserted path to legitimation, Teubner ultimately remains tied to the state and its forms. Indeed, one can see in the notion of intermeshing a three dimensional
95. Cf. PAUL R. VERKUIL, Outsourcing the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310–34 (Jody Freeman & Martha
Minnow eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2009); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy
and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 511 (2011); Fenner L. Stewart, The Corporation, New Governance, and the
Power of the Publicization Narrative, 21(2) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 513–51 (2014).
96. See Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 410–27 (2004).
97. Teubner, supra note 55 at 9.
98. Id. at 2, 9–10.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id. at 10.
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model in which intermeshed inter-company networks align with intermeshed national regulatory structures. 101 In so doing, he avoids the
more interesting question of the possibility of communities of corporations (and other non-state actors), like the community of states, coming together for the elaboration of governance frameworks that can
exist autonomously. Yet Teubner’s argument can also be read to suggest something novel in his concept of intermeshing: the intermeshing
of networks of multinationals may create an autonomous framework
of networked communities which themselves might communicate with
autonomous networks of states. The networks themselves would give
rise to governance frameworks that at some level suggest that of international organizations within the modern internationalized state system. 102
The model of the state and the multinational as the basic and default binary foundation of analysis may no longer be as relevant as it
once might have been. Just as multinationals have congregated within
networks, so too have states. It is those functionally differentiated networks of states—either formally or informally constituted—that might
best serve the interests of helping corporate codes reach escape velocity. Such a result is not the product of altruism, but instead might flow
naturally from the value to groups of states of a consolidated and autonomous community with which it might negotiate for more efficient
global relationships. Here, globalization is a crucial factor. This consequence suggests the construction of polycentric governance frameworks in which the corporation might owe duties to states in which
they operate (and within the political system of which they assume a
subordinate role), and also simultaneously assume obligations under
social norm systems generated by and generally applicable to the
global community of corporations. We move then from Teubner’s
state privileging universe—a universe in which the habits and forms of
law-state systems are replicated—to a governance universe in which
actors may acquire obligations and privileges grounded in the socialnorm frameworks of non-state regulatory communities, legitimated on
101. The notion echoes the move toward regulatory governance but in a more complex
setting. See, e.g., Udaibir S. Das et al., Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System
Stability? An Empirical Analysis, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (May 2004) at 1, 4–43
(IMF Working Paper, WP/04/89).
102. Consider the related notions of networked horizontal global governance groups, the
structures of which have been elaborated by Anne Marie Slaughter. SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER, supra note 46; Candace Jones et al., A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 911, 911–45 (1997).
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their own terms. These new actors take a variety of forms, from internally self-constituted multinational enterprise governance systems 103
to social norm systems grounded in the public obligations of private
actors in international social norm systems. 104 Li-Wen Lin has recently
argued that these private transnational law systems might well leak into
the law of host and home states as well, and as such, ought to be an
object of comparative law study. 105
An excellent example of this was the work of the Business Leaders
Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR) through 2009. 106 Initially,
BLIHR developed a “tool box” consisting of several guides for businesses on human rights. 107 These eventually were merged into a comprehensive guide developed in conjunction with the United Nations. 108
In addition, BLIHR promoted the human rights global governance of
businesses by participating in the processes and submitting reports to
the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights 109 in
the effort that produced the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and
103. See Larry Catá Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REV. 541, 561–
70 (2006). See also Backer, supra note 80.
104. See, e.g., John Ruggie (Special Representative on Human Rights), Promotion of all
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. G.A. A/HRC/11/13 (April 22, 2009).
105. See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor
Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57(3) AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (2009).
106. Legacy-Opening Memo, BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVES ON HUMAN

RIGHTS,https://web.archive.org/web/20091020081739/http://www.blihr.org/ (last visited Sep.
13, 2016) (“In 2003, we set out to find practical ways of implementing the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in a business context. . . . The Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights
has been a business-led organization involving 16 of the world’s major brands during this period.”). BLIHR ceased work in 2009. See Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, BLIJR,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/company-policysteps/other/business-leaders-initiativeon-human-rights-blihr (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
107. See Home Page, THE HUMAN RIGHTS MATRIX (June 24, 2010), http://www.humanrights-matrix.net/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). It was developed in conjunction with John F. Sherman & Chip Pitts, Human Rights Corporate Accountability Guide: From Law to Norms to Values (Dec. 2008), http://www.humanrights-matrix.net/assets/Accountability_Guide_2008.pdf,
and BLIHR, About The Guide, BUS. LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS http://www.integrating-humanrights.org/home.
108. The Guide for Integrating Human Rights into Business Management, BUS. LEADERS
INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.integrating-humanrights.org/home (in conjunction with the U.N. Global Compact and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideHRBusinessen.pdf.
109. John G. Ruggie, a professor at the JF Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
For the details of the collaborative work of Professor Ruggie as SRSG leading to the UNGP, see

Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/SRSGTransCorpIndex.aspx.
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Human Rights. 110 The organization bridged governance regimes
through its appointment of individuals with substantial influence in
multiple public and private governance sectors. Thus, Mary Robinson,
former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and
President of Ireland, served as BLIHR honorary chair. 111 In this complex intermeshing, one can discern the development of consolidated
norms within networked aggregations of privately constituted autonomous groups, negotiating for a harmonized set of regulatory standards
at a supranational level. Indeed, BLIHR produced a set of toolkits and
assessment tools that themselves complemented those that were specified in the United Nations Guiding Principles themselves. Together
each constituted a set of soft law norms that could be taken up and
hardened within the operations of enterprises that embraced them—
and they suggested, the societal obligations of the enterprises to do so
in any case. At this level, the public law versus private law distinction
falls away as well. Sally Engle Merry has examined the way in which
the mechanics of soft law systems—principally the toolkit and assessment tools of organizations like BLIHR—solidify and harden soft law,
at least within the enterprise. 112 Such tools, she argued, increase the
enforceability of soft law. 113 Rule and technique merge in a context in
which international norms are adopted as binding within the governance universe of corporate operations; soft law becomes hard within
the internal governance frameworks of the enterprise and, thus internalized, the techniques of corporate management—contract, standards, internal policy, monitoring, and discipline—become central to

110. See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights for Implementing the UN
Respect
and
Remedy”
Framework
(UN
HR/PUB/11/04,
2011),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf,
endorsed
A/HRC/RES/17/4
(June
16,
2011),
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement. The
BLIHR were also instrumental in and by organizing international events, including the December 2008 International Seminar on Business and Human Rights held in Paris, France.
111. See The Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/blihr_/blihr_en.pdf. The interconnection
among the individual actors thus married the institutional interconnections through which these
projects were advanced.
112. Sally Engle Merry, Firming Up Soft Law: The Impact of Indicators on Transnational
Human Rights Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 373–74 (Terence Halliday
& Gregory Shaffer eds., New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015).
113. Id. at 376 (but such measures also reduce the power of soft law “to articulate a broad
vision of a just society.”).

“Protect,
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the construction of rule systems derived from their constituting normative basis in international “soft law.” 114
Still, Teubner has suggested the skeleton of the constitution of
governance without government and its elaboration in the form of corporate codes. But that skeleton suggests more the methodology of the
constitution of non-state states than it suggests the growing irrelevance
of the traditional soft law, hard law binary distinction. 115 In effect, the
“harder” the regulatory institutionalization, the “harder” the governance produced, whatever its form. 116 It is the constitution of government without a state, rather than the deepening of governance without
government, that is the real object of these constructions. 117
These temptations of governing ideology have a strong pull. It is
especially powerful in unpacking the realities of autonomous governance outside the state within functionally differentiated organizations,
like corporations (which legislate through contract and enforceable
policy within its supply or value chain), 118 and the meaning and effect
of their self-constitution. That push and pull between the universes of
state and of corporate governance is felt most acutely in some of the
most path breaking work on the characteristics and objectives of transnational law, an interrogation of which suggests another layer of tension between public and private in transnationalism, one that seeks to
deploy transnational law as either method or norm that might be used
in the service of existing parameters of political organization favoring
states and public organizations and disciplining non-state actors within
that construct.

114. Policy Report 4, BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.kajembren.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/BLIHR-4-Final-report1.pdf,
(last
visited Sep. 13, 2016) (“An important aspect of our work, especially over the last three years, has
been to focus on the effective and productive integration of human rights into business management systems: i.e. the ‘how’ as opposed to the ‘why’ or the ‘what’ of business and human rights.”).
115. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 765–98 (2010);
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54(3)
INT’L ORG. 421 (2000).
116. See, e.g., Birgitte Egelund Olsen & Karsten Engsig Sørensen, Strengthening the Enforcement of CSR Guidelines: Finding a New Balance Between Hard Law and Soft Law, 41(1)
LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION. 1, 9–35 (2014). There is a public law dimension as well.
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft Law of
International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 515, 528–31 (2009).
117. At its normative limit, see, for example, David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms

on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 912–20 (2003).
118. See Backer, supra note 80.
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IV. N EW F RONTIERS OF STRONGER BARRIERS A GAINST
C HANGE—T HE PROMISE OF T RANSNATIONAL L AW
That same tension, and the strength of the pull of the state, appears
in Peer Zumbansen’s excellent theorizing about the nature of the
emerging transnational law system. It is not uncommon to distinguish
among foreign, international, and comparative law. Most distinctions
posit that the first is the study of the law of domestic legal systems not
one’s own, the second focuses on the development of a legal order
among states and other international actors that arises outside of domestic legal orders (though interacting with and projecting power
within it), and the third is the method by which the first, too, can be
understood to engage in interactions with other systems.
Comparative law, then, suggests the manner in which academics
work through issues of structural coupling among any set of systems
they are willing to couple and de-couple; for example, private law, constitutional law, the regulation of enterprises, and the like. Comparative
law is sometimes, then, understood as something in between—it has a
function, to get from some point to another, but is not a field. Consider the emphasis of the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 119
the second part of which120 is devoted to a functional study of this busyness: the eighteen approaches covered speak to a broad range of functionality, but seem to avoid substance. 121
This approach has produced a certain amount of frustration. Ralf
Michaels’s contribution suggests both complexities of the issue of
method and the structuring of knowledge fields:
The functional method has become both the mantra and the bête
noire of comparative law. For its proponents it is the most, perhaps
the only, fruitful method; to its opponents it represents everything
bad about mainstream comparative law. The debate over the functional method is indeed much more than a methodological dispute.
It is the focal point of almost all discussions about the field of comparative law as a whole—centres versus peripheries of scholarly pro-

119. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
120. Id. at 305–869.
121. Id. at Part II. (These functions without a field include comparative disciplines, functionality, similarities and differences, legal families and comparative legal traditions, transplantation and reception, mixed legal systems, influence on national legal systems, Europeanization of
private law, globalization, Islamic legal culture, African customary law, language, legal culture,
religion, legal history, socio-legal studies, critical legal studies, and economic analysis of the law).
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jects and interests, mainstream versus avant-garde, convergence versus pluralism, instrumentalism versus hermeneutics, technocracy
versus culture, and so on. 122

What is missing for Michaels is greater methodological coherence.
We should look at the functions and dysfunctions of the concept of
function, including its latent functions, in the production of comparative law knowledge. We should look at whether it is functional or
dysfunctional, and we should see whether alternative proposals could
serve as functional equivalents. This should enable us at the same
time to start reconstructing the functional method as a constructive,
interpretative, rather than positive enterprise, as a way of making
sense of legal systems—constructing them as meaningful, instead of
merely measuring them. 123

This may well produce useful movement toward the construction
of a system 124 that might in part serve as a framework for evaluating
the law compared, 125 and perhaps, for some, to invoke comparison in
the service of legal unification. 126 “Functionalist comparative law has
not yet made sufficient use of the benefits of functionalism. This study
can only hint at the possibilities, but its findings suggest that a more
methodologically aware functionalism will provide us with better insights into the functioning of law.” 127
This foundational issue of disciplinary self-conception has moved
from comparative law to the emerging field of transnational law. 128 In
an excellent essay, Peer Zumbansen makes a strong case that transnational law, like comparative law, is better understood as a methodology
of law. 129
On the one hand, [transnational law] emerges as a series of contemplations about the form of legal regulation with regard to bordercrossing transactions and fact patterns transgressing jurisdictional
122. Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 340 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
123. Id. at 363 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 372–73.
125. Id. at 373–76.
126. Id. at 376–78.
127. Id. at 381.
128. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1–16 (1956).
129. Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 899 (Jan Smits ed., 2006), reprinted in KING’S COLLEGE LONDON
DICKSON POON SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES: PAPER NO.
2014–29 (2012).
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boundaries that involve a mixture of public and private actors and
norms. On the other hand, transnational law continues to evolve as a
thought experiment in legal methodology and legal theory. 130

What follows, for Zumbansen, is “the recognition that transnational law presents an important opportunity to reflect on law and its
connections to ongoing investigations into local and global forms, institutions and processes of governance.” 131 From this flows the critical
contention that transnational law “invites a fundamental reflection on
what is to be considered law.” 132 As a consequence, transnational law,
itself, sits in between—not law in the classical sense, nor the product
of the domestic legal orders of states, nor the system of relations
among traditional subjects of international law. But does this reduce
the transnational to method?
Zumbansen starts with transnational law’s origins in the middle of
the last century. He notes its expansion as the global legal and economic order changed in the aftermath of the construction by the victorious Allies of the post-1945 global framework. 133 The maturing of
these investigations suggests two directions for transnational law. On
the one hand, and like comparative law, it assumes a parasitical role—
“to spread out into different legal fields, in scholarship as well as in
legal education.” 134 On the other, transnational law has “matured in
their conscious thematizing of the underlying methodological and
conceptual challenges that arise from law’s embeddedness in a comprehensive, multi- and interdisciplinary discourse.” 135 Enter globalization. In the context of the opening up of governance in the wake of
movements toward global freer movements of goods, capital, services,
and to a lesser extent, labor, transnational law finds a space to evolve.
Yet there is a sense that for transnational law to emerge as a field, some
sort of unifying theory is necessary, one tied both to the forms of law
and to its effectuation through the apparatus of government irremovably tied to the state. 136 In the absence of this conservative activity,
transnational law, like its cousin comparative law, remains fit for
method—and function—but not necessarily as a field apart from the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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fields of law, it either displaces or transforms. 137 It is to those fields that
Zumbansen then turns. Here is Zumbansen at his best; his discussion
of the transnational element within these old fields might better suggest not so much method as the construction of the field with its own
methodology. To that end, Zumbansen examines lex mercatoria, 138
corporations, 139 human rights and transnational anthropology, 140 comparative constitutional law and transnational constitutionalism, 141 administrative law, 142 and transnational human rights litigation. 143
Zumbansen ends with an examination of transnational legal history, societal memory, 144 and transnational legal education. 145 Of these,
the last section on legal education is particularly insightful. Issues of
field or methodology become most important when one is trying to
organize knowledge for the purpose of teaching this to others, and of
developing a vocabulary and reality framework that makes concepts
understandable and useful. De-territorialization of legal education, at
least within elite schools, has produced a dialectical process in which
national traditions continue to shape education the content of which is
increasingly unbounded by those very traditions. 146 This is not merely
a problem for shaping the relationship between teacher and student—
it is equally important for the shaping of academic communities and
markets for knowledge.
I suggest that Zumbansen sees the unifying methodological strands
of the fields that retain their independence from each other even as
they lose connection to states, the contours of which he masterfully
examines. I wonder, though, if it is possible to see beyond the methodology and over the barriers that separate traditional fields a set of
substantive unifying elements that might illuminate the contours of the
constitution of substance of transnational law as a field. Zumbansen
deftly posits the form of the field. Yet it may be possible to define a
field itself beyond a focus on utility. To move beyond field, as useful
137. For a quite different perspective but along the same lines, see, for example, Mathias
Reimann, From the Law of Nations to Transnational Law: Why We Need a New Basic Course
for the International Curriculum, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 397, 401–09 (2003).
138. Zumbansen, supra note 129, at 7–8.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 8–10.
141. Id. at 10–11.
142. Id. at 11–13.
143. Id. at 13–14.
144. Id. at 14–15.
145. Id. at 15–16.
146. Id. at 17.
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structure construction could serve as a means of making coherent the
integrity of traditional fields by limiting them to their traditional borders, making room for other fields when the reality of action bursts out
from the borders of the domestic legal orders the territorial limits of
which used to supply field coherence.
Zumbansen’s discussion of the transnational element in comparative corporate law is instructive. 147 Corporate governance is deeply embedded at once in the domestic legal order of states and operates within
a complex mix of transnational standards, guidelines, external and internal standards of conduct, monitoring, and transparency that center
the corporation within polycentric governance frameworks that are at
once public and private. This “de-territorialized production of norms
is the radical challenge these processes pose for the way in which we
distinguish between law proper and non-legal ‘norms’.” 148
But that is precisely the problem that the ideology of the state
would posit—for inherent in this challenge is the presumption that the
distinction between law and norm is important, and that the quality of
obedience to law and norm within corporate governance is of a different quality. And thus, the way this “feeds into a broader research inquiry” 149 can be bent to the service of the state by positing question
and answer in the context of rule of law based on law-state primacy
(though it need not). For Zumbansen, though, this complex cocktail of
public and private, of law and norm, of state and private government
producing multiple simultaneously applicable rule structures that are
harmonized within the internal operation of the enterprise, 150 serves to
illustrate the borders of the ideology within which the law-state operates and as well, “the way in which we begin to understand this emerging transnational regulatory framework as an illustration of contemporary rule-making, the long-standing legal pluralist contention of
formal and informal legal orders comes to be seen in a new light.” 151
Indeed, the construction of this seeming complexity still requires and
147. Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative
Law as a Critique of Global Governance, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMPARATIVE LAW

193 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (“What makes corporate governance such a
promising example for the study of the prospects of comparative law, is the field’s enormous
regulatory dynamism, which oscillates between national historical idiosyncrasies on the one hand
and the extremely volatile impulses that it receives on a global scale, on the other.”).
148. Id. at 194.
149. Id.
150. Id. For a similar perspective, see Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance, 23 WIS. INT’L L. J. 477, 485–91, 497–503 (2005).
151. Zumbansen, supra note 147, at 194.
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relies upon the preservation of the sphere of law as separate and separately legitimate, bound up in the distinction between “law and other
spheres of culture.” 152
The object, then, is to bring governance outside the state within
the normative universe of the ideological framework of the state—the
method is through the expansion of the spectrum with a view to legal
pluralism that “might help better understand the distinctly transnational emergence of regulatory regimes.” 153 This permits “us to study
such regimes not as being entirely detached from national political and
legal orders, but as both emerging from them and reaching beyond
them.” 154 But this produces recognition only of semi-autonomy of such
systems—the pull of the state is strong. And it is in this semi-autonomy
that the tension in public and private governance in emerging transnational orders arises in the form of method, not norm—“represented in
the tension between a ‘formal’ law and policy-making apparatus on the
one hand and spontaneously evolving ‘informal’ norms in particular
social contexts on the other.” 155
I have roughed out the possible contours of how a normatively coherent field of transnational law might be understood. 156 It may contribute another strand to what Zumbansen correctly describes as a history of a term, the variances of which “can be attributed mostly to the
different doctrinal and theoretical backgrounds of those employing
it.” 157That suggests both the value of the methodological approach
well theorized by Zumbansen, but also the normative framework
within which methodology can be liberated from an unnecessary service to state ideology.

152. Id. at 194 (citing EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 486–508 (Walter L. Moll trans., Russell & Russell 1913) (1962)).
153. Zumbansen, supra note 147, at 195.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 195 (citing Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973)); Julia Black & David
Rouch, The Development of Global Markets as Rule-makers: Engagement and Legitimacy, L.
& FIN. MKTS. REV. 218 (2008).
156. Larry Catá Backer, Principles of Transnational Law: The Foundations of an Emerging Field, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (March 9, 2007), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/03/principles-of-transnational-law.html.
157. Zumbansen, supra note 129, at 6.
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V. T OWARDS S ELF -C ONSTITUTING POLYCENTRIC G LOBAL
O RDERS W ITHOUT A POLOGY
Zumbansen and Teubner have brought notions of governance
without government a long way. They have pointed the way to conceptualizations that detach governance from the state and de-center
the state from webs of command that are regulatory but not conventionally “law.” Yet neither author has suggested a thoroughgoing escape from the orbit of the state. For both the state remains the touchstone, whether in form or in function. The state retains a strong power
as the ideal against which other governance organizations must be
measured, and sometimes around or with which a non-state system
must orbit to obtain that measure of legitimacy that would vest a governance minded non-state organization with the modicum of the authority with which the state is vested.
What started as a recognition of a changing reality—that states no
longer entirely control the rule systems for the interactions among
their citizens or residents 158—has itself appeared to be moving toward
organization with systemic qualities in its own right. Transnational
law represents a new and independent legal order, the concepts and
contours of which remain highly contested. 159 Already, some of its
practices have suggested its transformative potential for the most fundamental ordering principles of the construction of the state and its
basis in law. 160 It points to the reconstitution of a global law that is

158. See generally PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Yale University Press,
1956).
159. See, e.g., Craig Scott, ‘Transnational Law’ as a Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions,
10 GER. L. J. 859, 876 (2009).
160. A number of scholars have begun to explore these possibilities from different perspectives. See generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
LAW BEYOND BORDERS (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012) (overlapping regulatory authority producing hybridity); NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST
STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (Oxford 2011) (blurring of distinctions between national
and international); GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (Hart, 2010) (transnational
rule systems in and through private law); Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond
the State, 14 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 447 (2007) (private law as system beyond the state).
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neither global nor ordered, 161 and that breaks down the barriers between public and private in rule making and enforcement 162 and between national judiciaries and processes. 163 Is it possible, though, to
flesh out the beginnings of a theory of transnational law that might
provide a framework for escaping the orbit of the state, and the constraints of a process centered ideology?164 That requires a reconsideration of the premises about the nature and institutional operation of
law, an area of inquiry still very much beyond consensus. 165 “If a useful
model of transnational law could be devised—a working notion of what
might link together social phenomena under this conceptual label—
perhaps the possibilities of relating together studies of transnational
legal developments in seemingly disparate areas could be enhanced.” 166
In that light, consider the following version of a preliminary model:
One starts with a fundamental premise: transnational law can be

defined as the organizational law of non-state governance systems. These are the rules that make transnational rules and the insti-

tutional systems through which it is derived, and applied, authoritative,
predictable and certain. They are the rules to define non-state governance systems and that can be enforced against them. It serves as the
operational shell of institutionalized systems of rules. The definition
suggests both commonalities and differences between “transnational
law” as a distinct legal field and conventional legal fields derived from

161. See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for
the 21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 177–

199 (2012).
162. On the privatization of lawmaking, see, e.g., Paul B. Stephen, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1593–1617 (2011); Daniela Caruso, Private Law and StateMaking in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 29–59 (2006). There is an
interesting wrinkle here as well—the subcontracting of lawmaking from administrative agencies
to private parties. See Kimberly N. Brown, Public Laws and Privcate Lawmakers, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 615, 619–645 (2016). On the difference with privatization of function, see, e.g.,
HERBERT WULF, INTERNATIONALIZING AND PRIVATIZING WAR AND PEACE 36–64 (Palgrave,
2005); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 1–
56 (2007) (critical of the movement toward privatization and outsourcing).
163. See generally Maya Steinitz, Transnational Legal Process Theories, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INT’L ADJUDICATION (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter, & Chrisanthi
Avgerou Oxford, 2014).
164. See Roger Cotterrell, What is Transnational Law? 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 500, 502–
04 (2012); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study ‘Transnational Law’, 1 U.C .IRVINE
L. REV. 97, 109–11 (2011).
165. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 159, at 876.
166. Cotterrell, supra note 164, at 503.
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the legal orders of nation-states. Like domestic law fields, transnational law includes a constitutional element (a basic set of presumptive
and supreme organizing principles and rules), 167 a substantive element
(implementing the constituted system), 168 and a process element (rules
for the development of substantive rules and dispute resolution). 169 Unlike domestic legal orders, which are exercised through one
specific institution (the state) transnational law covers a wide number
of distinct governance communities existing simultaneously and organized beyond the rule-imposing power of states. Moreover, these governance communities are not necessarily organized in the same way as
states—with a population and a defined geographic territory and an
institutional framework exercising plenary authority. Rather, transnational law communities may be understood as functionally differentiated communities organized for mutual benefit within specific objectives. 170 They can include groups, institutions, and networks. They can
include religion as a governance institution in its own right as well.
In one sense, then, transnational law can be understood as the
study of the system of principles and rules applied either in lieu of or
in addition to the domestically germane law of a state, or community
of states, or to the relationships among persons and institutions—public and private, natural and legal. It focuses on methodology and interconnectivity, on networks and intermeshing of systems in constant
communication. Yet that does not provide much substance that is not

167. Thus, for example, if one considered the International Monetary Fund as a transnational governance order, one might look to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund to serve as its constituting document. See Articles of Agreement, INT’L MONETARY
FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2016) (adopted
at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference on July 22, 1944).
168. One might understand the IMF’s policy determinations and the implementation of
its obligations as the substantive element of its organization. See, e.g., Selected Decisions and
Selected Documents of the IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp (last updated Dec. 31, 2013).
169. One might consider the bylaws of the International Monetary Fund as its procedural
architecture. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BY-LAWS RULES AND REGULATIONS
(2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/blcon.htm.
170. On functional differentiation, see, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism:
Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 13–15 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004); Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1419, 1425–29 (1991). On the democratic deficiencies of such communal law producing
groupings, see, Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 221227-256 (2008); Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 25, 42–52 (2003).
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itself derivative or reflective of the state system and of law, conventionally conceived. It also suggests the danger that the definition of transnational law is so broad that it must embrace everyone and everything.
In a better sense, then, transnational law might be understood as a law
for the constitution of normative systems with binding effect or the
constitutionalization of the societal sphere. From this constitutionalization it is possible to consider the extent and nature of specific subsystems that may spring from it. “The question is now whether the
integrative function of a constitution is of the same nature as the normative.” 171
Transnational law is tied neither to a state nor a single jurisdiction.
No single person or entity controls the creation and regulation of
transnational law. 172 No one person or entity and no single institution
controls transnational lawmaking, it might be understood as the emergence of societies “organized by appetitive.” 173 Transnational law is
not dependent on a single lawgiver or regulator; it can be understood
as a layering of law and rule systems the authority of which extends to
objects subject to multiple regulatory regimes. 174 Transnational law is
thus the study of law that does not belong to or can be controlled by
any single system of domestic or international law, as both have been

171. DIETER GRIMM, INTEGRATION BY CONSTITUTION, 3 I·CON 192, 195 (2005); see
also id. at 198–203 (preconditions for constitutional integration).
172. See, e.g., GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010); Cf., Sigrid Quack,
Legal Professionals and Transnational Law Making: A Case of Distributed Agency, 14 ORG. 643,

643–66 (2007).
173. DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN
A TIME OF DISCONTENT 21, 38 (2004) (“Economic integration was intended to break the identity of geography, government, economics, culture, and emotion that too often engendered violent nationalism, and to create instead a new cosmopolitan situation, in which geography, government, economics, culture and emotion are polymorphously linked rather than conterminously
arrayed.”).
174. Its foundational essence, then, is essentially polycentric in a context in which every
regulatory jurisdiction is limited and incapable in reaching to every aspect of a regulated object.
John Ruggie understood this as a necessary consequence of the governance gaps at the heart of
the challenge of regulating Transnational Corporations: “The overriding lesson I drew . . . was
that a new regulatory dynamic was required under which public and private governance systems—corporate as well as civil—each come to add distinct value, compensate for one another’s
weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles . . . . International relations scholars call this
“polycentric governance.”
JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
78 (2013). This layered governance and its reworking of the nature of state sovereignty in the
international system of states is not unknown in public law. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 112–35 (1995).
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traditionally constituted. 175 Diffusion of regulatory authority is one
key to understanding the structure of transnational lawmaking. Another key is functional differentiation of authority among a wide variety of political and nonpolitical communities. 176 And it may also extend
to the diffusion of the concepts on which law systems themselves are
built—for example, concepts like the rule of law itself, 177 which may
constitute “a meta text for all transnational normative orders that speak
to law, justice, or ‘regulation.’” 178 The system of hierarchical and vertically integrated regulatory systems grounded on the state as the pinnacle of lawmaking and on the community of states as the disciplinary
mechanism for relations among states has been augmented by regulatory systems covering matters beyond the reach of any single
state. 179 Transnational law starts from the premise that law and lawmaking are no longer the exclusive preserve of political states, or of the
community of states. 180 Transnational law posits that political communities no longer hold a monopoly on law making—that law systems are
no longer grounded on an identity between law (or regulatory authority) and the state (and the community of states). 181 Autonomous supranational actors, private global actors, and communities grouped by
function or affinity can, to some extent, produce regulatory systems
understood to be transnational—even those that threaten the foundations of the state order. 182
The transnational in law requires a reconsideration of law and its
relationship to the state. 183 Transnational law is neither a single or unitary system of laws, rules and principles, nor necessarily systems that

175. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 164, at 102–05.
176. On functional differentiation of authority within systems, see, for example, Luhmann,
supra note 170, at 1419.
177. Jothie Rajah, ‘Rule of Law’ as Transnational Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS, 340–373 (Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2015).
178. Id. at 369.
179. This produces substantial repercussions on conventional assumptions about the hierarchy of law and its legitimation premises. See, e.g., Marie-Laure Djelica, From the Rule of Law
to the Law of Rules, INT’L STUD. OF MGMT. AND ORG., Spring 2011, at 35, 35–61 (2011).
180. See generally H. Patrick Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 839–862 (Mark Tushnet & Peter Cane eds., Oxford, 2012).
181. For an earlier intuition, see generally Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise:
A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV,. L. REV. 732, 732–92 (1970).
182. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, The Globalization of Fatwas Amidst the Terror Wars, in
THE POWER OF LAW IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD: ANTHROPOLOGICAL ENQUIRIES 96–114
(Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., Berghahn Books, 2009).
183. See generally Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Communities and the Concept of Law,
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mimic those of the state. Transnational law is not a unitary system of
laws and rules analogous to the legal structure of a state, or the treaty
and custom structure of the law of nations; it has no pretense to a singular global law that amalgamates the power of states for its
own. 184 Transnational law is an amalgam of rule systems, of hard and
soft law, that are limited in scope, but effective within the scope of the
authority of the rulemaking community, both autonomous and reflexive. 185 The key characteristic of transnational sub-systems is their functional limits. 186 Like classical federal systems, all transnational sub-systems are based on grants of limited and specific authority. These limits
are defined sometimes by function (commercial law, investment, human rights) and sometimes by other factors (shared belief, citizenship
in particular political communities and the like). The aggregation of
sub-systems constitutes the field of transnational law. However, transnational law as a whole ought to be grounded in certain principles and
rules that form the basic focus of any study of this field. Its foundational premise rests on acceptance of the existence of a system of nonnational, supra-national or multi-national principles and rules applicable, in accordance with its own terms and logic, to public and private
actors, and natural and juridical persons. This system exists independent of the control or authority of any one state or of the community of
states as a whole.
Transnational law is structured in accordance with its own logic,
quite apart from that which organizes the state. 187 There are four characteristics that form the basis of the study of the grounding rules and
principles of transnational law and law-making: (1) scope of authority,

21 RATIO JURIS 1, 1–18 (2008).
184. See generally Bryan H. Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account
of why a global Commercial Legal Order is emerging, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1049 (2014)
(analyzing the structural constraints on development of transnational governance orders beyond
commercial law).
185. See generally Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatization of
Civil Law and the Civilization of Private Law, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185,
188–194 (2002).
186. See Poul F. Kjear, The Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A Continental
European Perspective on Governance, Law, and the Political in the Transnational Space, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 489, 494-510 (2010). Cf. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, MAKING GLOBAL DEALS:
NEGOTIATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE (1991).
187. But see Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory,
Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT’L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305
(2012).
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(2) institutional autonomy, (3) regulatory authority, and (4) effectiveness of power to settle disputes. These have a constitutional element 188
as the organizing principles that give the regulatory community form
and set its organizational boundaries. Such principles include the constitution of a government apparatus and the rules for the operation of
the governance power vested in this organization. They also have substantive and process elements. They include the rules, laws, and other
norms that are produced or administered by the community and the
process rules, through which they are applied, enforced, constructed
and interpreted. Thus the substantive rules of transnational law systems ought to be distinguished from the “constituting” rules of a transnational system itself. The former has been the object of increasing
study. The latter has not. Yet it is the latter that is crucial for the
emergence of the transnational as a “field” of “law” in its own right.
“What—in the domestic context—would, for example, justify a
strict separation between labor law on the one hand and corporate
law, on the other? We should know and did already know for a long
time . . . , that the justification of distinguishing between these two legal fields, despite its ‘functional’ persuasiveness . . . , is at its core political[;] similar justificatory moves occur in both emerging and maturing transnational legal fields.” 189
At the heart of self-constituting communities is an independence
born of consent to join together for certain purposes. 190 Functional
differentiation rather than territorial differentiation marks the borders
of the stateless government and governance beyond law. Autonomy
presupposes an ability to distinguish the community from others, that

188. On this possibility, from a variety of perspectives, some of them critical, see, for example the approaches of Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of
Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 1–19 (2011); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65
MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004); Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of
Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996).
189. Peer Zumbansen, Law & Society and the Politics of Relevance: Facts and Field
Boundaries in ‘Transnational Legal Theory in Context,’ 11 NOFO (INTERDISCIPLINARY
JOURNAL OF LAW AND JUSTICE) 1, 4–5 (2014), http://www.helsinki.fi/nofo/NoFo11Zumbansen.html. See also Kaarlo Tuori, Transnational Law: On legal Hybrids and Perspectivism, in
TRANSNATIONAL LAW: RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING 11, 52 (Miguel
Maduroi, Kaarloi Tuori, and Suvi Sankari, eds., 2014) (“This is a major reason for legal hybridization at the level of fields of law; the emergence of new putative fields of law that confuse the
time honored systematization.”).
190. These autonomous orders occupy a variety of fields. For example, consider the emerging arbitral legal order discussed in EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 38–46 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010).
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is, to define the characteristics that mark the community as distinct in
the sense of permitting the regulation of its members. System autonomy permits the constitution of communities as self-referencing; these
communities look to their own constituting norms as the source of the
rules under which the community operates within the scope of its purpose. The state does not serve this purpose. The authority to “legislate” additional rules from the organizing or constituting rules of the
community, like the authority of legislatures to enact statutes constitutionally permissible, suggests a regulatory authority that when combined with autonomy creates the space for the governmentalization of
non-state rule systems that operate outside of the territorial competences of states. 191 An institutionalized system for making rules, developed from the framework adopted by a group, unified as a community
and bounded by defined purposes, maintains its integrity through systems for the enforcement of its community and the rules developed for
its management—as it does for the classical state through its bureaucracies. 192 Transnational systems include methods for settling disputes
among members and to maintain communal discipline. These techniques can range from expulsion from the group193 to more elaborate
systems of monitoring and disciplining based on quasi-judicial processes maintained within the system or arising from out of it. 194
All transnational law systems share certain characteristics. Transnational law is not bound to the jurisdiction of any state. It is based on
systems of partial and contingent regulatory authority; each regulatory
system is dependent on others, to some extent, and yet is complete
within the scope of its authority. Transnational legal systems are both
horizontally and vertically integrated to some extent with each other
and with domestic and international systems. The self-regulating cor-

191. On the possibility of shifting locations for authority, even authority relating to “legality,” see, generally, for example, the discussion in A. Claire Cutler, Locating “Authority” in the
Global Political Economy, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 59–81 (1999).
192. See, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic World, SOC. THEORY, March 1994, at 1, 1–18 (Loic J. D. Wacquant & Samar Farage
trans., 1994).
193. See, e.g., The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
194. Larry Catá Backer, Apple, Inc, the FLA and the Governance of Supplier Labor Standards Beyond the State, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Jan. 17, 2012), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/apple-inc-fla-and-governance-of.html.
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poration evidences nicely the contours of governance without government, or government without the state. 195 It is also illustrative of the
tensions of public and private governance in emerging transnational
systems understood as a tension in the application of ideology in its
legitimating function. We have seen that one of the greatest strengths
of ideology is the way in which it can fade into the background, into
the functioning apparatus of the state. 196 What appears neutral may be
little more than the expression of presumptions that constitute an ideological framework for understanding and managing reality. 197 Those
presumptions then are unacknowledged as they operate in the background, as long as they are uncontested. 198 Unremarkably, these presumptions create the background against which everything else is developed. 199 Law, especially the science of law, is particularly susceptible
to such management. Lawyers tend to be the servant of the law and
legal systems. The lawyer’s craft is grounded in large part on the ability
to absorb the governing ideology of a legal system and then deploy it
in two ways: first, to preserve the integrity of the system in which the
lawyer operates, and second, to use the rules of that system, consistent
with its normative ideology, to serve the needs of those for whom the
lawyer works. 200
Corporate law is no stranger to this phenomenon. 201 Corporate
law, more than other fields, seems strongly attached to the ideology of
195. See Larry Catá Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REV. 541, 561–

70 (2006).
196. FRANK BURTON & PAT CARLEN, OFFICIAL DISCOURSE: ON DISCOURSE ANALYSIS,
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE (1979).
197. This is particularly acute in the long running American argument over the societal
and legal framework for managing its inter-racial relations. See, e.g., ANDREW KULL, THE
COLOR BLIND CONSTITUTION 1–22 (1992) (race neutrality and anti-discrimination principles);
contra Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62–
69 (1991).
198. But even when exposed, they might be subsumed within the ideological contests that
then protect the system from the revelations of its structural basis. Consider in that light the
exposure of the agendas of power elites within a highly networked elite in the United States. C.
WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (Galaxy Books, 1959).
199. This was nicely developed in the case of European anti-Semitism in DANIEL JONAH
GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE
HOLOCAUST 27–79 (1996); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GERMANY: DISCRIMINATION IN THE
NAME OF NEUTRALITY: HEADSCARF BANS FOR TEACHERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN
GERMANY 1–33 (2009).
200. Cf. JAN M. BROEKMAN, & LARRY CATÁ BACKER, LAWYERS MAKING MEANING:
THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION II (2013).
201. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. WHINCOP, AN ECONOMIC AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
GENEALOGY OF CORPORATE LAW 196–220 (2001).
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the state and state power. 202 Though one might think that corporate
law would be an odd site for the promotion of state and state-system
ideology, a little thought suggests the strength of the tie between the
normative foundations of corporate law and the normative basis of the
state. That tie was brought home recently. 203 The authors have found
that European firms use the Societas Europea (SE) form to avoid mandatory co-determination rules, but not necessarily to shop for the most
favorable national corporate law to fill in gaps in SE regulation. The
analysis is solid and the conclusions are strong. But what drew my attention was the characterization of the behavior to be studied—what is
commonly called legal arbitrage. In their review of the literature, the
authors noted:
Legal arbitrage can be defined as taking advantage of differences between legal regimes governing the same economic activities (or close
substitutes). In the case of company law, legal arbitrage may occur
especially when firms can choose to incorporate in different jurisdictions without having to relocate their business activities. Corporate
law arbitrage is a demand side precondition for charter competition
among jurisdictions: if firms do not react to differences in company
law, there is no point for jurisdictions in competing for incorporation. Legal arbitrage, therefore bears on the longstanding academic
debate on charter competition. 204

The authors cite the greatly influential American authorities for
the idea of competition between public regulators for corporate charter business and the ensuing “race for the bottom” when states suffer
the indignity of exposing their legislation to a market where exit is possible. 205

202. One acquires a sense of this as the essence of the corporate law is transposed—the
essential connection between the management of capital aggregations, macro-economic concerns
and the overarching authority of the state and its constitutive obligations are written into law.
See generally Berbard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Reinforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911–82 (1996).
203. See generally Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert & Lars Hornuf, Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG.
REV. 1, 1–33 (2009).
204. Id. at 3.
205. See principally, William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666, 696–700 (1974). Yet the direction of the movement may go to
the top rather than the bottom. See, generally Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977). Its direction
may also be indeterminate. See, generally, William Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere
in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 402–03, 418–25 (1994). At least in the American context,
it might be argued that this approach enhances shareholder value. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
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The description is accurate, but it also veils a set of ideological presumptions that it embraces and advances through its analytical framework. 206 The first is that corporations must be governed by a single
statutory framework. The second is that there is an optimal statutory
framework that is (usually) connected in some way to the site of an
entity’s center of operations. The third is that statutory competition
(arbitrage) reduces the power of the state to assert policy objectives.
These assumptions are in turn based on a more fundamental assumption—that states stand at the center of the regulatory project as the
privileged entity, whose authority and autonomy (especially regulatory
autonomy to impose its will on all of its subjects) ought to be protected
against incursions from non political actors operating within the territory of a given state. The focus of legal arbitrage is the state and its
needs, rather than the corporation. The object of the study of corporate behavior is to ascertain whether they are behaving in ways that
preserve the regulatory privilege of the state within a rule system,
where states have some measure of responsibility for providing a basis
for permitting the enhancement of shareholder value. But this ideology is challenged by the reality on the ground in enterprise operations
across borders—a reality that produces overall order within a set of
shifting legal parameters that are themselves influenced by international regulatory regimes. 207 And it has produced the sort of governance gaps that have made international and private interventions necessary. 208
However, if one assumes away the privileged position of the state,
it is possible to think about what is called legal arbitrage in a substantially different way. 209 Globalization makes this possible in ways that
would have been more difficult to conceive even a decade ago. In a
world in which capital may be freely moved virtually everywhere, the
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14–32, 37–44 (1993).
206. Aspects of which are considered in SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 125–
84, 237–85 (1996).
207. See, e.g., Franco Furger, Global Markets, New Games, New Rules: The Challenge
of International Private Governance, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF
GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 201, 240 (Richard P. Appelbaum et al. eds., Hart, 2001)
(private governance is “theoretically challenging because they suggest the possibility that constellations of private actors can under certain conditions provide a variety of public goods and
sustain rules, norms and standards without or with minimal intervention by nation-states”).
208. See, e.g., RUGGIE, supra note 174.
209. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1,
4–9 (2008).
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state becomes a means for the production of capital, or, a cost to its
production. Those means and costs focus on the ability of the state to
facilitate capital production through investment (its regulatory structures and its police powers to produce stability in its territory), and the
costs include the price the state charges for its services (tax and regulatory costs). From yet a different perspective, states produce regulation that is then consumed by economic enterprises who must choose
among these “rule commodities” in arranging their own operations to
maximize their use in producing wealth. But laws are different in different states. Beside the cultural element, and perhaps the preference
of its electorate, 210 this reflects both that states are not equal in power
and influence (even within their own territories), 211 and that states may
be subject to coercion from above—the consensus of international organizations to internationalize domestic law to different degrees, 212 or
from the consumers of regulation themselves. 213 Corporations consume regulation like they consume labor, capital and other items necessary for their operation. Within this conceptual universe, regulatory
markets can be understood to operate like other markets (labor, capital, consumer, etc.) though subject to their own peculiarities. The traditional object of lawyers and of jurisprudence has been to center a
search for legal harmonization around the optimum set of conditions
and structures that would move law from an object of consumption to
a foundation for production. 214 Legal arbitrage becomes something
210. This is not an insignificant caveat. One can note that some states have used this notion
of national characteristics as the central element of their lawmaking enterprise and their willingness to resist internationalization, legalization, and judicialization of the international sphere with
effects on their national territory. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH
TOWARD RULE OF LAW 55–124 (Cambridge 2002).
211. See, e.g., STEPHAN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 184–219
(1999).
212. See, e.g., Claire Cutler, Human Rights Promotion through Transnational Investment
Regimes: An International Political Economy Approach, 1(1) POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE 16,
28–29 (2013); Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order,
18(2) IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 751, 782–800 (2011).
213. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and
Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 59–60 (1993) (“When a state self-consciously engages in
regulatory competition, it recognizes that it is an economic institution that must compete in an
open economic setting—that it must sacrifice or compromise domestic policy in order to achieve
international economic policy goals.” Id. at 59). In the context of globalization, see also,
RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 39–46 (1999); KENICHI OHMAE,
THE END OF THE NATION-STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 117–40 (1996).
214. For an excellent example, see CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHERINA PISTOR, LAW
AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 27 et seq. (2008).
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less odd, focused on the corporation rather than the state and on international standards rather than law. 215 And its transnational element
permits arbitrage not merely of law but of private standards as well. 216
Ideological lenses, especially those fixated on the superiority of the
state system and its territorial principle (and presumption that for
every entity there is a singular public regulatory home), can cause people to see the same thing in substantially different ways. In the case of
legal arbitrage or self-regulating corporations, the difference in vision
is a function of the assumptions about the role of states and the state
system in their relation to corporations. The “problem” of legal arbitrage is important where the preservation of a law hierarchy grounded
in the state system is implicitly embraced. The opportunity presented
by the self-regulating corporation is important where the state is subsumed within a transnational regulatory space.
From this ideological perspective, what might appear as soft law
under the presumptions of state ideology takes on the characteristics
of binding obligation. The inevitability of institutionalized inter-governmentalism—the EU approach to dealing with extra-territorial governance 217—necessary under the logic of state ideology 218 has had to
make room for a different approach. This distinct approach is one
grounded in the contractual and economic relationship of actors
215. Hiram E. Chodosh & James R. Lisher II, International Arbitrage of Controversial
Medical Technologies: An Introduction, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 363, 364–65 (2003) (“Legal

arbitrage is a variant of the economic practice. . . . Theoretically, arbitrage decisions may be made
on the substantive law (or lack thereof) or the strength (or weakness) of the institutions responsible for enforcing it.”). See generally the discussion in Anthony Ogus, Competition Between
National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis To Comparative Law, 48 INT’L
& COMP. L. Q. 405, 405–18 (1999); Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental
Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 174 passim (2006).
216. That has become the subject of certain legal regimes, for example food production,
discussed in PRIVATE FOOD LAW: GOVERNING FOOD CHAINS THROUGH CONTRACT LAW,
SELF-REGULATION, PRIVATE STANDARDS, AUDITS AND CERTIFICATION SCHEMES (Bernd
van der Meulen ed., Wageningen Academic Publishers 2011). See generally Khalid Nadvi,
Global Standards, Global Governance and the Organization of Global Value Chains, 8 J. OF
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 323, 323–43 (2008) (esp. Section 2); Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld &
Deana Newsom, The United States’ Race to Certify Sustainable Forestry: Non-State Environmental Governance and the Competition for Policy-Making Authority, 5 BUS. & POL. 219 passim (2003)(forestry).
217. NEIL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
103–276 (Palgrave Macmillan 6th ed., 2006); Uwe Puetter, Europe’s Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and the European Council in EU Economic Governance,
19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 161, 161–78 (2012).
218. Backer, supra note 80. The self-regulating corporation provides an example of the
way in which ideology affects analysis and the assessment of the possibility of legitimately constituted governments outside the state.
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bound in sometimes complex systems, the rules for which increasingly
arise in contract, in standards developed by transnational civil society
actors and enforced through decisions of consumers and investors as
much as arbitrators and communal actors serving in a decision-making
capacity. 219 But even intergovernmentalism has acquired a dimension
in law beyond the law structures of domestic and international legal
orders. 220 This is not so much a new governance that focuses on the
means of government and the expression of legality 221 as it is a reframing of government systemicity in which the state and its identity with
law is de-centered. 222
Thus, just as lawmaking might have become unmoored from the
state, the state has itself become unmoored. 223 That unmooring suggests more than the reconstitution of states within a more generalized
public law based system, but also reconstitutes law beyond the state—
it becomes trans-national. 224 It is in this context that the matter of corporate citizenship225 serves as a proxy for the equally important converse issue—that of the private rights of states as participants in global

219. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21(1) J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 130–48 (1992) (esp. Section IV).

For the classic study of the use of social norm systems to develop order within a self reflexive
community, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 123–267 (1991).
220. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 47.
221. See generally R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUD. 652–67 (1996). For the conversation about the “new governance” in its
current form, see, for example, Orley Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004).
222. See generally GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS
AND RUNNING CODE, supra note 14, at 96–152; Ken Conca, Old States in New Bottles?: The
Hybridization of Authority in Global Environmental Governance, in THE STATE AND THE
GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 181 (John Barry & Robyn Eckersley eds., 2005).
223. See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFIALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING
ORDER: THE EVOLVING STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE 11–40 (2008).
224. This suggests a more robust autonomy than the concept of separateness, of derivative
character of law and governance less attached to the state, might otherwise suggest. See, e.g.,
PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 36–67
(2002). For other consideration of law autonomy from the state in a number of variations, see,
for example, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, INTERNATIONAL LAW BEYOND THE STATE: ESSAYS
ON SOVEREIGNTY, NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011) (Part II essays); PAUL
SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS
23–60 (2012); GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
RELATIONSHIPS, LEGAL ISSUES AND COMPARISON (Edoardo Chiti & Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella eds., Springer 2011) (esp. Part III essays).
225. See, e.g., GRAHAME E. THOMPSON, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE
GLOBAL CORPORATE SPHERE? 53–98 (2012); Teubner, supra note 13, at 156.
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markets. 226 At the international level, states and other collectives might
well have to meet more as equals, even as they interact within vertical
hierarchies in particular contexts. 227 But even those localized hierarchies are now unstable. Corporations negotiate “agreements” with
states in organizing their production chains, 228 non-state actors develop standards to regulate global production, 229 and nations negotiate
treaties that export their internal governance. 230 Large corporations
can coerce small states in ways that mimic the ways in which larger
states can do the same to smaller and more vulnerable ones. States and
corporations are now capable of deploying forces in the field—sometimes states hire corporations that serve as mercenary armies 231 that
protect its own operations as well as those of the institutions of the
state from sub-national and supra-state threats. 232 The clear lines of
226. See generally Hao Liang, Bing Ren, & Sunny Li Sun, An anatomy of state control in
the globalization of state-owned enterprises, 46 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 223, 223–40 (2015); Larry
Catá Backer, Globalization and the Socialist Multinational: Cuba at the Intersection of Business
and Human Rights, in A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY CUBA: ECONOMY, POLITICS, CIVIL

SOCIETY, AND GLOBALIZATION 287–99 (Mauricio A. Font & Carlos Riobó eds., Routledge
2013).
227. See, e.g., Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private
Authority in the International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3–22 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); Susan K.
Sell, Structures, Agents and Institutions: Private Corporate Power and the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM
91–106 (Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey RE.D. Underhill, & Andreas Bieler eds., 2000). But see
Jeffrey Dunhoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 675 (2006).
228. See generally JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 665–705 (2d ed. 2008).
229. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION
44–72 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
230. See, e.g., Jiangfeng Li, Equal or Unequal: Seeking a New Paradigm for the Misudsed
Theory of ‘Unequal Treaties’ in Contemporary International Law, 38 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 465,
493–98 (2016); Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 118–22 (2005); Andrew T.
Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 672–73 (1998).
231. See, e.g., Roni A. Elias, The Rise of the Private Military Form in International Conflicts: A Problem of Legal Authority and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 CONN. J. INT’L L. 93,
97–104 (2015); Daphné Richemond-Barak, Rethinking Private Warfare, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM.
RTS. 159, 169–74 (2011); FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., Oxford 2007) (see
especially the introduction to these essays at 1–10).
232. See generally Jose L. Gómez del Prado, A United Nations Instrument to Regulate
and Monitor Private Military and Security Contractors, NOTRE DAME J. INT’L, COMP. & H.R.
L. 1, 4–23 (2011); Lawrence W. Serewicz, Globalization, Sovereignty and the Military Revolution: From Mercenaries to Private International Security Companies, 39 INT’L POL. 75 passim
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public and private authority, and even the once clear lines of its Marxist-Leninist opposite, have become blurred.233 In that context, constitutionalism and the constitutionalization of governance have become
more complex concepts. 234 More importantly, the range and capacity
of players has substantially increased as well.
It is in this context that it is possible to conceive of the transnational as a normative construct. That is, to see the transnational as
something more than a process for filling governance gap, or an invitation to multilateralism or a methodological trope—and in this later
construction one with all of the ambiguous eddies of comparative
law. 235 It is that reality that is emerging from a better view of changes
on the ground in this century that no longer conform comfortably to
the ideologies on which our systems were constructed in the last century. And it is that reality that may drive scholars, and the elites who
order the world, toward a new understanding that the governance systems they are operating are transnational in both a normative and a
process sense.

VI. C ONCLUSION
In 1927, the American philosopher John Dewy considered the
problem of the state. 236 He suggested, well before world warfare and
globalization changed the realities of the state within the web of power
relationships that mark the 21st century, that “[t]here is no more an
(2002).
233. Chinese socialist modernization, a core element of the Basic Line of the Chinese
Communist Party Constitution, has been criticized for its deviation from Soviet Marxist Leninism and an aberrational conflation of Marxism and markets. See, e.g., Hu Yaobang, Create a New
Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization, BEIJING REV., http://www.bjreview.com.cn/90th/2011-07/01/content_373428_2.htm (last updated July 1, 2011). Cf. ALAN R.
KLUWER, LEGITIMATING THE CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORMS: A RHETORIC OF MYTH AND
ORTHODOXY 61–70 (1996).
234. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, The Concept of Constitutionalization and the Multi-

Corporate Enterprise in the 21st Century: From Body Corporate to Sovereign Enterprise, in

MULTINATIONALS AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD POWER SYSTEM
170, 179–188 (Jean-Philippe Robé et al. eds., Routledge 2014).
235. I refer here generally to earlier readings of Roscoe Pound, The Revival of Comparative Law, 5 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1930); O. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law,
37 MOD. L. REV. 1–27 (1974); UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1998);
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Reinhard Zimmermann & Mathias Reimann
eds., Oxford 2006). These I read as suggesting both the intractability and complexity of seeking
to understand the value and objects of comparative law as methodoly, as ideology, and as a means
of harmonization of communication in a world in which legal systems may not need to align but
must avoid inhibiting transactions between them.
236. JOHN DEWEY, THE GLOBAL PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927).
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inherent sanctity in a church, trade union, business corporation, or
family institution than there is in the State. Their value is also to be
measured by their consequences. The consequences vary with concrete
conditions. . .” 237 Globalization has made possible the realization of
this insight in ways that Dewey could never have predicted. We have
been moving from the recognition of the possibility of governance
without government, to that of the reality of government without the
state. Part of the difficulty of that recognition has been the ideological
blinders created by a continuing adherence to state ideology as an ordering structure of reality for purposes of analysis. But another part is
made up of both habit and nostalgia for the idea of the state (as the
only possible legitimate foundation for human political organization)
that manages, in turn, economic, social and cultural life. The resulting
tension between public and private governance in the emerging transnational legal order, then, is best understood as the consequence of the
emergence of a peculiar governance system. That system, though networked with and operating in the same spaces as the state, has not necessarily embedded in either the normative ordering framework of the
state system or the state ideology that provides authority for that assertion of power. 238 But reality is not in tension with itself. What ultimately emerges as the engine of tension are those mediating explanatory structures that have yet to catch up with the realities emerging in
real space.

237. John Dewey, Discovery of the State, in LEVIATHAN IN CRISIS: AN INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON THE STATE, ITS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, BY FIFTY-FOUR TWENTIETH
CENTURY WRITERS 3, 13 (Waldo R. Browne ed., Viking Press 1946).
238. Indeed, one can understand the state as preserving its authority only as a state of exception to itself—that is, the normative aspect of the state as an apex authority is contradicted by
the facts on the ground which is still asserts is bound up within the law-state system itself. Consider by analogy the undermining of law within the state system through the invocation of a state
of exception to law required by the shifting facts on the ground that is the unending crisis of
terrorism. Cf. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 87 (Kevin Attell, trans., U. Chicago
Press 2005) (“The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted within impunity by a governmental violence that—while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally—nevertheless still claims to be applying the law.”).
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